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ADEQUATE NATURAL GAS SUPPLY FOR FUTURE PREDICTED

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 18 May 83 pp 25,26

[Article by Klaus Liesen: "No Shortages in This Century"]

[Text] Natural gas, because of its assured reserves and the magnitude of present resources, will be available even to Western Europe well into the future. Owing to its technological properties and its economy both in production and in transport, natural gas affords an important contribution to the cost-effectiveness of energy supply. Natural gas is technologically and economically ideally suited as a substitute for domestic heating oil and contributes in a significant way to the security achieved by a diversification of the energy import palette.

There is no longer a single industrialized country which does not import energy. Import quotas do, however, differ greatly in their proportions: the Italian energy import quota amounts to 87 percent, while Great Britain's is a mere 10 percent; the import quota of the Federal Republic runs to 63 percent, that of the United States 17 percent.

The chief cause of these import quota differences is found in the differing geological situation of each country, whereby many are definitely in a position, technically and geologically, to increase their share of domestically produced energy. That they have neglected to do so has to do with costs or problems of environmental pollution.

The starting point for a decision--affecting both individual energy import companies as well as national energy policy--as to which types of energy are to be imported, from which region and in which proportions one to another, must be the awareness that there is no absolute certainty in international raw material trade. The past 10 years have confirmed this fact world-wide. This is why imports must, in the long run, achieve a high degree of relative certainty. The key to this is the distribution of import requirements over a variety of energy types and a range of energy exporting countries.

The quality of the export countries' certainty is, in turn, only one of the characteristics which must be considered in the decision-making process affecting energy imports. The other factor is cost-effectiveness. While it is

determined decisively by the straight energy price, it does contain other elements as well: environmental compatibility, suitability for advanced technology, effect upon the balances of trade and payments, etc. These elements can, as a rule, be expressed in monetary terms and are generally taken into account in the assessment of prices. The ultimate, decisive touchstone for the price is the long-term competitiveness of imported energy for the end consumer.

The question of whether natural gas will be available in adequate quantities over the long haul has seldom been mentioned in recent times. Information based on facts has figured in this.

Natural gas at present comprises about 20 percent of world energy consumption and makes up the third leg, along with coal and oil, supporting world-wide energy supply.

The static magnitude of assured exploitable resources (i.e. energy reserves divided by present consumption) now amounts to 50 years--including additionally exploitable so-called natural gas reserves, as much as 150 years. The Conservation Commission of the World Energy Conference therefore gives natural gas a significantly larger long-term magnitude than it does petroleum and anticipates a trend toward higher world natural gas production which it estimates for the period 2000 to 2020 at double present levels.

The conclusion can be drawn from available data that we do not need to be concerned over the next 40 years for shortages that could result from a lack of reserves.

This holds true for Western Europe, specifically those countries having natural gas reserves of their own: Belgium/Luxembourg, West Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Spain. In these countries, natural gas, with an average share of 16 percent of primary energy consumption, is at present also the third pillar of energy supply. Western Europe is included among the chief centers of currently known natural gas reserves, compared with its potential import competitors, the United States and Japan, and is geographically in at least an equally favorable position.

Therefore, unless there is a radical change in the economic and political relationships which have until now permitted the dynamic upward trend of the international gas economy, a long-range pattern of stability, extending clearly past the year 2000, can be predicted for natural gas's share of Western European energy supply.

The fact that the natural gas needs of Western Europe can be fully covered by domestic production and already concluded import agreements through the 1990's underscores this. Additional natural gas supplies needed beyond this can be limited to an order of magnitude of some 55 billion cubic meters annually for all of Western Europe.

In light of Norway's currently large and continually growing reserve situation and the foreseeable prospects for supplies from other, non-European areas, such additional supplies for the second half of the 1990's may be achieved with a high degree of certainty. This holds true even if we should abandon plans for additional import projects for supplies from the Soviet Union.

As far as the certainty of natural gas supplies in Western Europe goes, it is striking that governmental energy policy--not simply in the Federal Republic, but in all other energy-dependent countries which are tied into the natural gas pipeline net--sees the import of natural gas and the expansion of national gas economy as an important contribution to the improvement of national energy supply security. There are two reasons for this assessment in existence now for some time:

--Natural gas is technologically and economically particularly well suited to replace oil in the domestic heating market;

--Natural gas's risk situation is different from that of oil and therefore especially suited for a diversification of the energy supply palette.

The particular suitability for substitution is the result of three factors:

--Natural gas can, as a rule, be obtained under conditions which make it possible to deliver this energy source in areas of urban concentration, suburban areas and smaller towns without state subsidy and at competitive prices. We can assume that this condition can also be maintained into the future. The quantities of natural gas required by Western Europe can be produced and transported at competitive prices.

--No problems of environmental compatibility are generated through the replacement of heating oil by natural gas. On the contrary, the environmental situation will be improved.

--In functional terms, there is no deterioration through substitution since gas, because of its properties, is especially suitable for maximally effective use. In recent years, we have seen significant advances made in the technological development of gas-fired devices.

The difference in its risk situation as compared to oil, with the resulting diversification effect through the use of natural gas, is based primarily upon two elements: upon technological necessities which are different from those using other energy sources, as well as the fact that natural gas generally originates in other areas than those producing oil. These other areas present, as seen from today's perspective, a lesser risk of cutoff than do those of the Middle East.

The transport of natural gas from its source in the exporting country to the border of the importing country does involve enormous investments which cannot then be used for other purposes than fulfillment of the export contract in question, or by accepting very substantial economic disadvantages. This leads to strong parallelism of the interests of exporting and importing countries with the

goal of maintaining the delivery relationship once it has begun.

This is also the reason why export and import countries have been willing and interested in concluding delivery agreements for 20 years and longer. There is no other commodity in international trade for which delivery agreements exist through the year 2000 and beyond. The fact that natural gas alone is traded under such long-term conditions is not to be ascribed to some caprice on the part of the natural gas market but is instead a natural consequence of the international parallelism of interests arising from the scale of investments on both sides, its extreme technical storage capability and the limitations necessarily set upon its utilization.

This also accounts for the fact that the natural gas import agreements signed in Western Europe before the energy price crises of the 1970's have remained practically unchanged--despite the complete change in the price situation and the power relationships.

The sole exception is the natural gas import agreements concluded with Algeria and Libya. In this instance special factors were at work which tend to confirm rather than call into question the above mentioned rule.

The relatively limited technological flexibility is thus one element of stability in natural gas supply. At the same time it must be recognized that this technological-economic situation has a definitely ambivalent character. If it should come to pass, despite this stability, that a delivery source should no longer be available, it can be replaced much less quickly than would be the case normally with the technically more flexible oil supply.

A disruption in natural gas supply must therefore be dealt with through other means--by contractually agreed overproduction of already tapped sources; through pre-planned switchover to other energy sources by large-scale consumers; through the use of underground storage capacities; by reversion to the national and the Western European pipeline network. Such measures are adequately available to the Western European gas economy.

With all of this it can be seen that many of the differences between the various energy types cannot be classified in generalization as better or worse than one another. Instead it is a matter of the unpredictable consequences of one crisis or another, to what degree the particular characteristics of one or another energy type operate positively or negatively. This precisely why it is advantageous, in the sense of risk distribution, to allocate energy imports among the various types of energy.

The aspect of regional dispersal of energy import sources produces a particularly favorable picture for the natural gas supply of Western Europe. Some 82 percent of natural gas consumed in Western Europe comes from Western Europe itself. In the case of oil, the share is only 25 percent. Only 5 percent of Western European natural gas consumption is supplied from OPEC countries which still supply some 50 percent of the area's oil needs.

While this especially favorable proportion may change over the next decade, the share of Western European production from domestic sources is estimated at some 50 percent for the year 2000. Natural gas will thus be able to make a significant long-range contribution to the regional dispersal of risk and to the reduction of import dependency upon the OPEC area.

This contribution will make itself especially felt in the Federal Republic, whose natural gas supply today is met to about 80 percent from Western European sources and which has not yet shown any dependency upon OPEC sources. For the 1990's we can estimate that the Federal Republic will derive about 70 percent of its natural gas from Western European sources and some 30 percent from the USSR; supplies from the OPEC area will probably play only a subordinate role until the year 2000.

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GAS, OIL OUTLOOK FOR NORTH SEA, BARENTS FIELDS DESCRIBED

UK, Continent View Sleipner Field

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 May 83 p 5

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll: "Hard Tug of War Over Sleipner Gas"]

[Text] In the shadow of the great political discussion about the reserves in the giant Troll Field, the negotiations on the gas in the Sleipner Field are now going into a decisive phase. A hard tug of war remains on the price and other conditions of delivery before the contract can be signed. The experts believe that Great Britain has the greatest need for secure gas supplies, but the continental gas companies are still participating in the negotiations.

The Sleipner companies, with Statoil at the head, must try to sell their gas in a market where conditions have recently moved in a less favorable direction, seen from a gas seller's viewpoint. West Europe's total gas consumption declined in 1982 for the third year in a row, and for the first time the total gas import by the EC countries was reduced.

But today's situation does not decide the destiny of Sleipner gas. If everything goes according to plan with a development measure in the Storting in the spring of 1984, the first gas from that field will hardly come to the consumers before about 1990. It will thus be a gradual stepping up of extraction for the next 4 or 5 years until the normal level of production for the coming years will be reached, the so-called production plateau.

The British supply situation is such that about one-third of their gas requirement is covered by the Norwegian-British Frigg Field. That will be empty some time in the beginning of the 1990's. The national British gas company BGC must therefore find new supplies, even if there is no growth in gas consumption.

On the other hand most current consumer countries on the continent appear to be reasonably well covered for the first half of the 1990's if their con-

sumption does not begin to grow. Gas from the Soviet Union, Netherlands, Algeria and the Norwegian gas that these countries have already purchased will, together with domestic production, be able to cover the needs. But also on the continent most expect that there will be a need for new import of significant amounts in the last half of the 1990's.

Not Only Price

From the Norwegian side there is naturally interest in selling gas where the best conditions can be obtained. In the first place it is the base price offered which will be of interest. But also a number of other factors will play a part, including the formulas which will decide the future development of prices, the technical demands placed on the gas, and the variations in production which can be permitted.

The price of gas is generally established in relation to the energy content. The unit used is called the British Thermal Unit (BTU), and prices are normally stated in dollars per million BTU. The most important factors which determine gas prices are the prices of competitive sources of energy and the price that gas can be purchased for in other places. Also a buyer's judgment of certainty of supplies, and desire for supplies from several sources can play a part.

For the companies which will develop Sleipner, namely Statoil, Esso and Norsk Hydro, it will be of decisive importance that they get a price which will ensure a reasonable return for the large investments which still must be made. The ultimate development plans will depend on the gas contract which is concluded, but it will be a matter of investments of well over 30 billion kroner, calculated in today's prices.

Independent British analysts have claimed that BGC does not want to go higher than about \$4.50-4.60 per million BTU. But even that price, which would be below what was expected by the Norwegian side, is well over that paid for gas from fields in the British sector. BGC statements that Great Britain needs Sleipner gas are therefore met with assertions from oil companies such as British Petroleum and Shell that sufficient reserves can be found in the British sector if such good prices could be obtained.

Soviet Gas

The continental buyers naturally want to compare the price of Sleipner gas with the prices which will be paid for the new gas from the Soviet Union.

If deliveries were now underway, this price would be about \$4.80. If these companies are still willing to adhere to previous intimations that a higher price could be paid for more politically secure gas from Norway, the base price for Sleipner gas could reach over \$5.00. That would, however, be somewhat below the original base price for Statfjord gas of \$5.50.

Just as important as establishing the prices is to agree on what the prices cover. The prices mentioned apply to gas delivered to the terminal on land. It can be expected that BGC will be interested in providing the transportation by taking the gas from British fields in the same pipelines. Buyers may want to have production stepped up or make other demands which will make development of the field more expensive. The Sleipner companies are therefore not interested in the highest possible base price, seen in isolation, but the agreement which gives the most favorable net result judged over the entire lifetime of the field.

If BGC ends up with Sleipner gas, there will either be a pipeline laid to St Fergus in Scotland, where the Frigg gas is now sent, or a pipeline from Sleipner will be connected to one of the existing pipelines from Frigg. If there is a continental solution, it will call for a pipeline either to Ekofisk directly or to the surface platform where the pipeline from Heimdal will be connected to the Statpipe pipeline. The effective capacity of the Ekofisk pipeline will give a slower increase of production to the continental alternative.

In this round the Sleipner negotiations are dealing with gas in the main field, and in the so-called Gamma structure. The total extractable reserves are estimated at about 200 billion cubic meters. Of this, about 160 billion cubic meters will be marketable dry gas. In the Sleipner Field itself the gas contains significant amounts of carbon dioxide. Furthermore it will produce wet gas. Other, smaller gas discoveries in the Sleipner area can be put into production later.

The carbon dioxide represents a significant problem because it is found in such large concentrations that especially expensive pipelines are needed to avoid corrosion if this gas is not removed at the field. Where the removal takes place must be clarified during the negotiations.

Expansion From 1986

If the sales negotiations go according to plan, Statoil will be able to present a plan for the expansion of the field to the authorities around the end of the year. The expansion work itself will take place from 1986 and beyond in a period when there otherwise will be a marked decline of investment activity on the continental shelf. Together with Oseberg, Sleipner will therefore be a welcome addition to ensuring utilization of capacity in Norwegian oil-based industry.

The large amounts of wet gas found in Sleipner must be brought to land via other pipelines than the dry natural gas. In this connection the pipeline Statoil will build from Ekofisk to Ula can be a possible alternative, but also pipelines on the British side can be used.

Negotiations for such comprehensive and long lasting contracts as we are talking about here are a complicated business, with possibilities for large

profits. One ore of difference in the price per cubic meter of gas can amount to 100 million kroner per year over a period of 20-25 years. The very open political process which is the basis for the shaping of Norwegian oil policy, using among other things detailed perspective analyses, makes the buyers largely aware of the concerns of the Norwegian negotiators. From the Norwegian side, the alternative is not to produce the Sleipner gas if a desirable price can not be obtained. But at the same time it is clear that such a measure could create problems with maintaining production in the 1990's and ensuring the orderly progress of the oil industry. It would be of great help to the Norwegian negotiators in the next gas round if one or more oil discoveries could be brought in nearly ready for development as an alternative if the gas prices are not good enough.

Caption [to map on following page]: Existing and planned pipelines give several landing possibilities for Sleipner. A new pipeline to St Fergus is also a possibility. In the beginning it is the Sleipner Field itself plus the Gamma structure which are planned to be put into production. There are also more smaller structures in the main block (block 15/9) and in the neighboring blocks which can be exploited later.


Labor Party Wants Oil Policies

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 May 83 p 5

[Editorial: "Gas in the North"]

[Text] Last week a new negative result of exploration at Tromso Flake was confirmed. A new dry hole was drilled by Statoil. The total result of exploratory drilling in the north so far, however, does not give a basis for drawing definite conclusions in any direction. From the first there has been uncertainty about the possibilities for gas production in the north. Uncertainty continues to exist. There will be many more years of exploration in the north before the resources of the area are all fully charted. Individual drilling results must therefore not be taken too seriously, seen in isolation. The final "writing on the wall" will first be seen toward the end of the 1980's.

The exploration area in the north will little by little be significantly expanded, and in the fall the government will decide which companies will share the new concessions for exploratory drilling. Then it will be a matter of three to five new blocks. Under Secretary Hans Henrik Ramm in the Ministry of Oil and Energy has, on two different occasions (in the United States) indicated that the government could be interested in giving concessions to foreign companies. This is not surprising for a Conservative Government. Especially when we know that the foreign companies are having their fill on Norway's map. Both on Traena Bank and Halten Bank foreign companies have been given "exploratory sites."



[Caption to above map on preceding page.]

The Norwegian oil group has been significantly strengthened following the Storting handling of the Troll issue. Elected officials now want to give Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga the highest priority in exploring the Norwegian continental shelf in cooperation. There is now sufficient Norwegian competence to be able to cope with the tasks. So it would be in conflict with the people's wishes and the Storting's intentions to let foreign companies gain a foothold in the north. It is a typical national duty to allow the Norwegian oil group in cooperation with Norwegian industry and the entire north Norway region to create a new business basis in parts of the land based on the activity on the shelf. We have the capacity and the resources to manage it.

If the government goes in for foreign participation in the exploration in the north, it is time to have a broad debate in principle on this fundamental issue in Norwegian oil policy. Until now we have needed foreign expertise on our continental shelf. The time has come, however, for full Norwegian control of the activities. Foreign companies will continue to have rights, but is there still any reason for them to participate as operators? We believe the answer is no.

From the early beginnings of the oil age there has been an emphatic condition tied to the policy that the foreign companies should participate on the Norwegian shelf during a transition period. They should transfer to our own oil industry sufficient expertise, and get a satisfactory compensation for their input. We are now reaching that objective. The Norwegian oil group is now able to manage our national interests on the shelf. Policies of the Conservative Government can therefore no longer be conducted from the tainted principles of the blessings of private capital.

There is no longer a majority basis for such viewpoints in the Storting, if we observe the Center Party's and the Christian People's Party's expressed viewpoints about what should be the principles of our oil policy.

The sale of Norwegian gas to West Europe will continue to press forward as a larger challenge. From the middle of the 1990's Norway can be the main supplier of gas to our part of the world, if we handle things wisely. The immediate future years will decide which place we will have in the future European energy picture, and in such a situation it is important that we are together on a number of overriding principles. One of these principles should in our opinion be that the most important challenges on the Norwegian shelf should be taken care of by Norwegian companies.

Valhalla Oil Field Starts Production

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 May 83 p 27

[Article by Flemming Dahl: "Fourth Norwegian Oilfield Opened"]

[Text] Valhalla Field, 26 May--The three orange-painted steel platforms on the Valhalla oil and gas field in the

southwest corner of the Norwegian continental shelf were declared officially opened on Thursday by Mayor Kari Thu of Stavanger.

The opening took place in an atmosphere of many good wishes that production at the field--which began last fall and so far has gone much more slowly than expected--soon will increase to the desired level.

Valhalla is the fourth and so far the smallest oil and gas area which is in production on the Norwegian shelf. It follows Ekofisk, Frigg and Statfjord.

The developed part of Valhalla Field--the so-called Valhalla A-project--is now estimated as costing about 8 billion kroner when all the planned production wells are included. At the beginning the estimate was considerably lower.

Amoco Norway--daughter company of American Standard Oil of Indiana--has the operational responsibility at Valhalla. The field is located in North Sea blocks 2/8 and 2/11, where Amoco plus Norwegian NOCO, American Texas Eastern and American Amerada have ownership shares.

To begin with the oil and gas are piped to the nearby Ekofisk installation. From there the oil goes through a pipeline to Teeside in England and the gas through a pipeline to Emden in West Germany.

The three Valhalla platforms--one dwelling, one drilling, and one management platform--are secured to the bottom of the sea in a depth of 70 meters. The platforms were mainly produced in Norwegian shipyards.

The experts considered that the oil and gas reservoirs in the field were very difficult to interpret from the seismological measurements, and this is given as a contributing cause for the production difficulties. The reservoirs lie in limestone layers, and one of the problems has been that large amounts of lime come up with the oil.

"I believe that any operator company would have had exactly the same difficulties as Amoco," a division chief at the Oil Directorate, Farouk Al-Kasim told AFTENPOSTEN. He does not blame the American company for the disappointingly poor results.

Al-Kasim maintains that the directorate does not see any reason to downgrade the previous estimates for the extractable oil and gas at Valhalla A which were estimated at 32 million tons of oil and 28 billion cubic meters of gas. Possibly the Valhalla companies must be satisfied with somewhat lower production than expected from each individual well, but that will be considered after several more wells have been drilled, said Al-Kasim.

He believes that experience from the first four wells has made it possible to drill a more successful fifth well, which will be put into production promptly.

According to prognoses from Amoco and the Oil Directorate from before the start of production in October, Valhalla should now produce 50-60,000 barrels of oil per day, but it is actually producing 11,000 barrels. That represents a shortage of income every day of 9-11 million kroner. In addition, gas production should have begun in February, but it is now expected to begin in July.

Immediately after oil production began Amoco adjusted the prognoses down for the immediate future months, and in accordance with the revised figures oil production should now be 33,000 barrels per day. That means the income shortage from the oil sales is 5 million per day.

Deep-Sea Drilling Research Urged

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 May 83 p 34

[Article from Norsk Telegrambyra: "Norway Should Invest in New Deep-Sea Technology"]

[Text] The development of underwater technology is one of the areas within oil activity at sea which Norwegian industry and research should invest in during the years to come, according to experts in the large international and Norwegian oil companies. They have, on the initiative of Norway's Technical Natural Science Research Council (NTNF) designated individual areas within oil technology in which conditions should justify a Norwegian industrial investment.

Development of underwater technology can give Norwegian industry significant competitive advantages and form the basis for export activity.

The leader of NTNF's oil section, Terje Tunaal, announced at a press conference the recent expansion of the Troll Field as a special challenge for Norwegian industry in underwater technology. A goal-oriented investment here can lead to development in this country before the end of this decade of the first production unit for oil and gas which is placed on the ocean floor.

The background for the recommendations which the oil industry and NTNF came up with is the so-called oil technology conversations which Norwegian authorities had with the major oil companies in 1978 and 1979.

The purpose of the conversations was to get as much benefit as possible from research and development conducted by the oil companies in the North Sea for

this country. For the period 1980-87 the companies have obligated themselves to supply Norwegian research activities with 2 billion kroner in the form of concrete assignments.

Just during the last 2 years Norwegian research has received about half a billion kroner per year for different projects and 50-60 firms are participating in cooperation on these projects.

"Through these conversations we have the opportunity to collect the world's oil experts around a table and point out the possibilities for industrialization here in this country. The oil companies have also found this co-operation useful," said Director Erik Skaug of NTNF at the press conference.

In all 11 groups consisting of 50-60 experts, who represent Norwegian and international oil companies, have been involved and have recommended project areas. The recommendations will be presented to a larger seminar in Trondheim next month.

So far the means supplied to Norwegian research and industry through the technical conversations have mostly been for the development of competence. Director Skaug hopes, however, that events are now moving over into a more industrial phase which can create jobs.

NTNF estimates that there are four areas of activity which are central. These are measures which will increase the rate of profits and the total production from a field, measures which will reduce expansion costs, measures which will strengthen or increase the security of installations in deep water fields and measures which will improve the competitive ability of the Norwegian oil industry in both the domestic and export markets.

Oil Production Increasing

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 May 83 p 32

[Text] The total Norwegian production of oil and gas rose to 18.7 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE) during the 4 first months of the year, an increase of 1.2 percent in relation to the year before. A strong increase in production on Statfjord Field contributed to oil production being 15.5 percent higher than in the same period last year, while production of gas was 10.8 percent lower.

Production of oil at Ekofisk Field continues to decline. In the period January-April this year 4.4 million tons were produced, compared to 5.1 million tons in the same period the year before. Gas was delivered corresponding to 4.5 million TOE from Ekofisk in the four months of this year compared with 5.4 million TOE in the same period of 1982.

The decline in production at Ekofisk is however more than compensated for by the increase of production at Statfjord Field. The Norwegian part of Statfjord production rose from 3.0 million tons in the four first months of last year to 4.9 million tons in the corresponding period this year. In April the average day's production from the two platforms at Statfjord rose to 404,000 barrels total.

The Norwegian part of production from the Murchison Field came up to 269,000 tons in January-April this year, while in the same period 134,000 tons of oil were produced from the Valhalla Field.

Shipping of crude oil from the Norwegian continental shelf came to 73 million barrels in the first 4 months of this year.

Labor MP Urges More Northern Oil Exploration

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 May 83 p 6

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Charting of Barents Sea Must Now Be Stepped Up"]

[Text] "Charting of the geological conditions in the Barents Sea has not come far enough, and it is important that we Norwegians intensify the seismic investigations to learn whether these areas can yield discoveries of oil and gas," Storting member Per A. Utsi told AFTENPOSTEN. He emphasized that the knowledge obtained from such investigation is necessary before exploration in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea can begin.

Per A. Utsi is a member of the Storting Energy and Industry Committee, and at the same time chairman of the Labor Party Industry Committee. In the Storting he is now chairman for the Storting report on perspectives for oil activity until the end of the century. Work on the committee position, which may possibly be released toward the end of this month, is especially demanding because of its breadth and extent, so the task has been assigned to one of the most experienced Storting representatives. Utsi is now in his third term in the Storting, and before he became a member of the Industry Committee after the last election, the 44-year-old representative from Finnmark was the vice chairman of the Defense Committee for 7 years.

Utsi says that since February he has worked on the committee position, and the entire time he has tried to gather the best possible knowledge of the oil industry through conversations, meetings, hearings in the Industry Committee and in conferences. A number of authorities also had to be heard. That included the three large Norwegian oil companies, Statoil, Hydro and Saga, the foreign companies, the Oil Directorate, the Ministry of Oil and Energy, the Norwegian Fishermen's Association and the National Federation of Labor.

"The greatest problem we are meeting is to get the best possible regularity in investments, to prevent the large swings in employment. We know that the peak of investment will be reached in 1984-85 and that investments will be halved in the period 1986-87, in order to grow. The situation can be improved if the Storting, in the first part of next year's spring session, can approve the expansion plans for the Oseberg and Sleipner Fields. Furthermore it is urgent to reach a decision on construction of a new refinery on Mongstad.

"We must, however, understand that in the years between now and the turn of the century, oil activity alone will not be able to "rescue" employment. We know that in the 1980's one quarter of a million new jobs must be created in this country. It is expected that oil activity in the year 2000 will give a total of 65,000 jobs--compared with 45,000 today. Growth in oil activity will thus not be nearly as rapid as it has been.

"That means that more Norwegian shipyards must readjust from shipbuilding to the offshore industry. But this is hardly a reason for expanding the total shipyard capacity in Norway," said Utsi.

"Should exploration for oil and gas be stepped up?"

"Exploration activity is not too high. Exploration activity should be moved from the North Sea to the areas north of the 62nd parallel. It is possible that doing that will create a total of more exploration activity than today. In any case it is important that new oil and gas reserves be discovered before the extraction from the existing fields comes to an end. Here we must be careful to have a solid head start."

"Do you expect a hard political conflict on the perspective report?"

"My impression is that there is growing and expanded understanding in Norwegian opinion in favor of more oil activity, and I expect that these attitudes are also present in the Storting Industrial Committee."

The recently released proposals from the Mellbye Committee, which evaluated the organization of state participation in oil activity, and the so-called "tempo committee" proposal will not be finally debated in this session, according to Utsi. The Storting will come back to it when the government has presented its proposal.

9287
CSO: 3639/118

BRIEFS

HYDROELECTRIC PRODUCTION UP--After a very dry winter, the spring rains are already causing some dams to overflow north of the Tagus river. According to EDP /Portuguese Electric Power Company/ statistics, the first dam to have completely filled up was the one in Vilarinho das Furnas, on 22 April of this year. The dams in Guilhofrei and Vale do Rossim followed, while the one in Venda Nova was close to 98 percent of its maximum capacity. For the first time this year, the water reserves are higher than they were last year, reaching 63 percent of their maximum capacity at the end of April. At the same time in 1982, the water reserves were around 62 percent. However, the situation is not uniform throughout. The level of some dams, such as the ones in Vilar, Castelo de Bode and Cabril, is still less than half of capacity. In any event, hydroelectric power production for the last week of April has already reached levels characteristic of a normal year. It covered 70 percent of consumption, which means a complete reversal of the situation existing until then. The week before, the hydroelectric power stations produced only 27 percent of the electricity consumed. The remaining 73 percent was provided by thermal power stations. Also for the first time this year, Portugal exported more electricity than it imported during the last week of April. A positive balance of 16 million kWh was recorded. /Text/ /Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 5 May 83 p 4/ 9935

CSO: 3542/131

ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

FLEMISH UNION LEADER ON ECONOMIC REGIONALIZATION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 15 Apr 83 p 2

[Interview with Willy Peirens, national secretary of the CSC, by Guy Duplat:
"The Flemish Christian Trade Union Plans To Take Another Big Step Towards
Federalism"; date and place not specified]

[Text] A step toward federalism, a step away from the C.V.P. [Christian Peoples Party]. That is the dual move to which Willy Peirens, national secretary of the C.S.C. (Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) seems to invite Belgium today. And not merely the Flemish where, as he points out, the consensus exists only in the mind of Mr Geens.

[Question] You are not only calling for the regionalization of the five national sectors, but also for the regionalization of the industrial policy in toto. Why and how far do you want to go?

[Answer] First of all, I must stress the fact that we are not the first to have requested that. For a long time the Walloon C.S.C. has been calling for economic federalism through the medium of the Christian labor union movement.

Two years ago, at the time of the Westende conference, we made an official request for the regionalization of the five national sectors, because we were forced to notice that the industrial policy was stuck in a dense fog. The economic powers are divided up between the national government and the regional executives. The national sectors are handled in a biased way. Progress on the textile plan, which was primarily aimed at the Flemish enterprises, was slow, while the iron and steel industry schedule favorable to the Walloons was making good progress. The national sectors have been and continue to be the cause of constant community disputes.

[Question] But don't the Walloons also call for the regionalization of other economic sectors, such as the infrastructure?

[Answer] No problem! In 1978 we had defined the area, including the infrastructure, which ought to remain national, but since then we were obliged to note that in this domain too a national policy was very difficult to carry out. Consequently, if such a course of action can avoid the costly policy of offsets and lead to greater clarity, we have no difficulty in accepting regionalization of the infrastructure, the educational system, credit, energy, and so on. But neither is it being said that this is an urgent need.

Useful for Brussels and Wallonia

[Question] But where will we stop on this road towards federalism? Why not regionalize the social security system as well, when the Flemish find out that they are paying for the French-speaking people?

[Answer] No. We are not adamant in this matter. Solidarity should continue to exist between regions as well as between industrial sectors. Moreover, I believe that a national policy is still feasible in regard to social areas.

Of course, if we should find that such a policy had become impossible, we should take a position as a trade union organization, but I repeat we do not wish today to go that far.

[Question] But you are adamant on industrial policy?

[Answer] Yes, for two reasons. We feel that the industrial policy should be based on the real state of affairs, i.e., on a regional basis, and we believe simply that a national policy is impossible.

[Question] Do you agree with Flemish nationalism?

[Answer] We do not advocate Flemish nationalism at all. Regionalization of the industrial policy is the indispensable condition for conducting a real policy in Flanders, but also in Brussels and Wallonia. I am very much astonished to hear Walloons assert today that Flanders wants Belgium to break up because it calls for the regionalization of the five national sectors. That is incredible in view of the fact that the Walloons have been requesting the same thing for a long time!

Our Walloon Friends...

[Question] Yes, but the Walloons have the impression that the regionalization which you call for is merely a means to discontinue aid to Walloon steel industry.

[Answer] From a political point of view, it is no longer possible to continue the subsidy of the Walloon steel industry in a national framework. But that is not the only request we are making. The coal mines too would be regionalized and much more if necessary.

[Question] Are we then going in the direction of economic separatism as some fear?

[Answer] I do not understand these fears. What is the alternative? Continue as we are today? It is easy to see that is no longer possible. Consequently, we must find another solution. Economic policies of greater autonomy for the regions do not mean that Belgium has come to the end of the road. One need only observe how different the Flemish and Walloon economies are already at this time.

But I must certainly stress that this economic autonomy must be accompanied by regional responsibility. We categorically refuse regionalism of consumption, and our Walloon friends must not call for economic autonomy at the expense of the National Treasury.

Social Combat or Flemish Combat?

[Question] For a long time the Flemish left has given priority to social combat, before Flemish combat. That was the big missing element in the Flemish movement. Today, things are changing. Aren't you afraid of setting Flemish workers against Walloon workers?

[Answer] There is a real risk of becoming hostage to the Flemish movement. One need only note how the Volksunie [Flemish nationalist party] is harnessing us in stating: "Let us all join ranks with the Flemish C.S.C." But one must realize that the Flemish movement is no longer merely the cultural and romantic movement of 15 years ago. Under the shock of the recession, and the growing unemployment, Flanders has become aware of the need to shape its economic future by itself.

The labor union movement is taking risks but I firmly believe that solidarity among all the workers at the national and European level is necessary. We shall continue to carry on a dialogue with the Walloon C.S.C. Solidarity must continue but in a clear atmosphere. To maintain there are no problems, and that one can continue today's policies without difficulties would amount to a great danger for this solidarity. It is much better to clarify problems and then organize solidarity.

[Question] Therefore, aren't you practicing regional corporatism?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Don't you think everything would go along better without the Walloons?

[Answer] No. We know very well that regionalization is not a solution per se.

Nothing would be miraculously better tomorrow. Our approach is pragmatic, down to earth. We are merely taking as our point of departure the observation that there is no way to carry on discussions on the national level and that every decision is contested by the other community.

No Flemish Consensus!

[Question] Do you think that a social consensus would be easier to achieve among the Flemish than at the national level?

[Answer] Just because Geens says that there is a Flemish consensus everywhere does not mean this is true. That is not true. Collaboration with the employers association is not any easier in Flanders than at the national level. The V.E.V. [Flemish Economic Association] is more reactionary than the F.E.B. [Federation of Belgian Enterprises] even though it is better organized than the national employers association, which no longer knows where it stands.

To be sure, we have been able to reach an agreement within the VESOC, the Committee of Flemish regional social consultation, on an assistance program for hard-pressed enterprises, but as for the third industrial revolution dear to Mr Geens, or his plan to employ at least 25,000 unemployed--we have been unable to discuss these matters. Moreover, it seems that Mr Geens does not like cooperation.

[Question] Doesn't this economic regionalization put the very existence of the national C.S.C. in question?

[Answer] No. I am sure it will remain possible to have discussions on the national level concerning delicate matters, to find mutual positions, and to lay down political guidelines. The application of these principles may differ from region to region, but that is already the case today. Even at the subregional level or from sector to sector, different positions may be taken. Certainly there may be "yes" votes opposed to the Walloon C.S.C. and the Flemish C.S.C. but that will not prevent a joint discussion. In any case, I refuse to admit that the problems which may come up are our fault. Without criticizing them in the least, I must mention the fact that our Walloon friends have been asserting themselves as C.S.C. Walloons for a long time.

[Question] But in a largely federalized Belgium, aren't you taking the risk of abandoning the C.S.C. Walloon to a minority position vis-a-vis the Walloon F.G.T.B. [General Labor Federation of Belgium]?

[Answer] No, I don't think so. The Walloon C.S.C. has its people, its programs and activities. It consistently wins the social elections, even without the help of the Flemish A.C.V. [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] in any way.

12309
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SURVEY OF NEW UNION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RULES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 16 May 83 p 7

/ Article by Taylan Erten: "A New Era in the World of Unions and Collective Bargaining" _7

/ Text_7 Labor laws undoubtedly function as determinants in connection with social democracy and its relationship to the democratization of the economy. The union and collective bargaining systems in practice in Turkey for the past 20 years have been reformulated after September 12, 1980, accomodating the era's own realities. How the current laws--Union Law 2821 and Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout Law 2822--will effect industrial relations, will surely be followed with great interest.

In developing societies, the process of defining and granting basic rights and freedoms is subject to frequent changes tied to conditions of each phase. Just as Turkey of the 1980's is different from Turkey of the 1960's, so, too, the shape of the collective bargaining and union system today differs from the concepts and practices of 20 years ago.

It is not possible to explain and evaluate a social event in terms of abstract concepts of freedom. With this in mind, the good and bad experiences of the past concerning labor laws and the use of rights included therein, can now, where unions are concerned, be evaluated in a responsible manner guided by common sense by a wide platform including workers, employers and those running the country.

For Turkey, the accomplishment of goals of development and economic growth is tied to contemporary efforts to base social unity on solid ground. And here, the key criterion, starting with industry, is just treatment of basic rights of labor, a prime element of the economic structure, and all workers; as just and even-handed as the treatment accorded to the rights of management.

During the civilian phase which is to start November 6, 1983, Turkey will meticulously watch over basic rights and freedoms of all sectors of society, supporting progressive development. And, in an intellectual milieu guided to encourage the entrenchment of these rights among the people, Turkey can, step by step, secure guarantees for a healthy democracy. The new labor laws with their emphasis on control mechanisms, demand such an approach.

The Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout Law

Compared to the repealed Law 275 it replaces, the Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout Law 2822, ratified by the National Security Council on May 5, 1983, brought with it new perspectives on basic concepts. The law contains clearcut definitions regarding some items involving procedures in collective bargaining, strike and lockout, and creates mechanisms that enable authorities in the administration to effectively intervene.

Even though the new law which consists of 84 articles is technically modeled after the old one, the following provisions are newly introduced:

The 5th article of the new law which was not contained in the old one identifies "clauses which may not be included in negotiations." Thus, excluded from bargaining are "clauses which are against the inseparability of the nation, national sovereignty, national security, public order, general welfare, morals and general health, as well as clauses which aid and abet illegal activities or disregard existing laws."

The option of bargaining for contracts "fixed or not in length" of the past is changed in the new law to "cannot be less than one year or longer than 3 years." Another related innovation, in the 7th article, is that "the term of a labor agreement cannot be altered by either side after the signing." Also, there are provisions enabling the start of the process for a new contract 120 days prior to the expiration date of the contract in effect.

The law empowers the Cabinet to set up collective bargaining in a labor sector, calling for the following in the 11th article:

"A labor agreement negotiated by the union which, from among the unions representing at least 10% of the workers of the particular sector, has the largest membership, can, upon request by a labor or employers union in this sector, or by one employer or by the labor minister, and after consulting with the Supreme Juridical Council, be extended by the Cabinet to include all or some other workplaces in the same sector which do not have a labor agreement, by implementing either complete, partial, or only needed changes."

One of the most important items provided by the Law 2822 and differing from the old law, deals with criteria applied to the collective bargaining authority. The subject of authority, taking on a very confused appearance during the past era because of contradictory decisions by judicial bodies and the administration's occasional biased actions, has been reworked in the 12th article:

"The labor union which has a membership of at least 10% of the workers of the sector to which it belongs (agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing excluded) is authorized to negotiate for the workplace or workplaces if more than half of the workers in each of the workplace or workplaces to be covered by the bargaining belong as members. Regarding operational contracts, workplaces are counted as one, and a majority of more than one half is computed accordingly.

In the old law, authority rested with the worker organization "representing the majority of workers employed in a sector."

Establishing the Number to Constitute Authority

The number of workers used to determine authority was based on membership certificates of unions according to the old rules, but will now be determined by the Ministry of Labor. The 12th article of Law 2822 also assigns to the mentioned ministry the task of publishing statistics every year in July. The total number of workers and membership in unions in the pertinent sectors that will be established in these statistics will remain valid for purposes of collective bargaining and other operations, until new ones are published.

Unions can apply to the Ankara Labor Court if the statistics which establish authority are thought to be unrealistic within 15 days of their publication, and objections are to be settled within 15 days.

Solving Conflicts

The new law is also revamping methods of resolving disagreements at various steps of the collective bargaining process. Thus, the party not participating in negotiations will be reported to the concerned authorities by the attending party within 6 workdays.

Along the same line, if 60 days after the onset of negotiations the sides establish in their minutes that they cannot come to a settlement, or if at the end of the 60th day after the onset of talks they could not settle their differences, the situation is to be reported to the concerned authorities.

The period in which mediators try to reconcile the parties has been set at 30 days in the new law, whereas the old law allowed for only 12 days. The procedure will be as follows:

"In the event that 30 days after the start of collective bargaining no settlement has been reached, each of the sides can request the participation of a mediator from the concerned authorities."

Strike and Lockout

The Law 2822 limits the right to strike, and acquires a new identity compared to the old law by adding to the legal strike definitions strikes of a political nature, general strikes, and strikes for show of solidarity. Besides adding these concepts that were not included in the 17th article of the old law regulating these matters, the new law prohibits occupation of the workplace, slowdowns, lowering of production, and resistance in general.

Illegal Strikes and Lockouts

The law has been expanded to include more labor sectors where strikes are prohibited. Accordingly, strikes cannot take place in the following sectors: life and property saving; funeral and burial; exploration, production, refining and distribution of water, electric, gas, coal, natural gas and oil; banking and notary public; publicly organized firefighting, sanitation, and municipal land, sea and rail transportation, and other public rail service. There can also be no lockouts in these sectors.

As far as workplaces are concerned, those included in the illegal strike-lockout category are:

Vaccine and serum producing establishments; hospitals, clinics, convalescent homes, out-patient clinics and drugstores; educational institutions; child-care centers, nursing homes; cemeteries; and workplaces under the Ministry of National Defense, General Command of Gendarmerie, and the Coast Guard Command.

In addition, during a war, or general or partial mobilization, no strikes or lockouts can take place. Also, the Cabinet will decide on matters of strike and lockouts in the event of natural disasters caused by fire, flooding, mud slides, avalanches, or earthquakes, crippling normal life.

Postponement

In this new era of collective bargaining, the Cabinet's terms for postponement of strikes and lockouts have also been changed. The old law allowed initial postponement of a maximum of 30 days, and a second postponement of a maximum of 60 days, whereas Law 2822 fixes the term at 60 days without recourse to lengthening the term. As in past practices, the concerned party can appeal to the Council of State to have the postponement decision annulled.

Sentencing in the New Collective Bargaining Order

Clauses regarding persecution in the new collective bargaining, strike and lockout law can be summarized as follows:

-Those persons introducing clauses in negotiations that are against the inseparability of the nation, national sovereignty, the republic, and national security, as well as aiding and abetting illegal activities, will be given prison terms lasting between 6 months and one year.

-Mediators appointed by the courts to help solve conflicts in labor negotiations, who are found to be neglecting the assigned duty for the purpose of damaging either side, or who, for the same purpose, fail to present the necessary documents to the concerned authorities, will be subject to heavy fines of between TL 10,000 and TL 25,000.

-Those persons deciding, instigating, or forcing to hold illegal strikes or lockouts, or spreading propaganda along these lines, will be sentenced to 1 to 3 months in prison.

-In the event of illegal implementation of a legal strike or lockout decision, those persons responsible will be subject to 1 to 3 months imprisonment and a fine of TL 10,000 to TL 30,000.

-Sentencing for those persons responsible for carrying out a strike or lockout prohibited by the Cabinet, will be in the form of 2 to 6 months in prison, and TL 50,000 to TL 100,000 in fines.

-In the event of a strike or lockout directed against the nation and its security, those persons who made the decision and who spread propaganda, will be given prison

sentences lasting from 3 to 9 months, and fines of TL 75,000 to TL 150,000. In the event a strike is carried out in this context, prison sentences will be not less than 1 year. Fines can be up to TL 300,000.

The Union Law 2821

The new union law presents conditions under which labor and employer unions can organize in Turkey in the various labor sectors. Although, according to the new setup the clause allowing the establishment of more than one union in a sector is preserved, unions cannot be formed based on occupation and workplace.

Another visible new feature of the union law is the requirements that would-be founders must meet. Thus, to be founder of a labor or employers' union, the requirement "to have actively worked for at least one year in the sector where the union will be formed" has been added to the other existing legal requirements.

Ineligibility for Membership

According to Law 2821, persons not eligible for union membership or to form unions are:

- Military personnel in workplaces under the Ministry of National Defense, General Command of Gendarmerie, and the Coast Guard Command, excluding civilian workers.
- Inspectors, controllers, directors of public agencies and establishments, banks and insurance companies, and other upper-level personnel.
- Persons working for religious institutions and in places of worship.
- Students.
- Teachers in institutions that come under the private educational establishments law.

Government Control

Differing from the old union law, the new system regulates government authority to control unions. According to the 47th article granting control, "the government has the authority to administrative and financial control over unions and confederations." Labor unions, employers unions and federations will be subject to annual inspection on location by the Ministries of Finance and Labor, jointly or separately. Should it be necessary, more than inspection can take place.

Prohibitions

Compared with the old one, the current union law includes some divergent conceptual features in regards to union activities. The 37th article of the new law decrees that "unions cannot pursue political goals." At the same time, unions are prohibited from establishing relations and forming alliances with political parties. The unions may not get support from political parties, nor accept aid or contributions.

Practices observed in the past allowing union officials to hold positions in governing bodies of political parties, have been terminated. With the new law, a union or federation official accepting a position in a governing body of a political party will have to resign from his union duties.

Similarly, those nominated for local or general elections will have to give up their duties on union or federation boards for the duration of the nomination; permanently, should they be elected.

Labor Sectors

The Union Law 2821 lowered the number of labor sectors to 28 from the 34 in the previous law by combining related work under one sector.

With the reorganization, those fields of work auxiliary to the main labor sector of a workplace will be considered as belonging to the main sector. What these auxiliary fields belonging to a main sector are, will be legally established according to international norms and in consultation with labor and employers' federations.

In January and July of each year, statistics of the number of workers in a labor sector, their union affiliation or lack of it, and the distribution of these figures pertaining to unions, will be published by the Ministry of Labor in order to establish the basis for allocating collective bargaining power.

The new labor sectors recognized by the union law now in effect are:

Agriculture and forestry, hunting and fishing; mining; petroleum and rubber; foodstuff industry; sugar; textiles; leather; wood; printing and publishing; chemicals; cement, ceramics and glass; metal; shipbuilding; construction; energy; commerce, office, education, banking and insurance, fine arts; ground transportation; rail transport; sea transport; air transport; storage and warehousing; communications; health; lodging and entertainment; national defense; news media; general occupations.

12203
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VIEWS, ACTIVITIES OF PEACE MOVEMENT SURVEYED

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German No 3, 1983
pp 197-203

[Article by Reinhard Raberger: "The Austrian Peace Movement and Its Position on Peace and National Defense"]

[Text] The new Austrian peace movement did not get started until 1982 as an institution that may claim to have transcended the ideological barriers dividing the traditional political parties. All activities in earlier years were carried out by individual groups and the question of whether these individual groups were intent on attaining balance must be answered in the negative. It therefore seems deserving of all the more merit that all the groups succeeded as a result of substantive discussions in going public with their goals in a joint demonstration—the 15 May 1982 peace march. A serious attempt at balance was made and it succeeded, thereby adding weight to the efforts for peace undertaken by all genuinely concerned citizens. This also explains why the political parties are lending continuous support to the peace movement (of ARBEITERZEITUNG of 13 and 14 Nov 82: "Peace Cannot Be Safeguarded by Military Superiority").

There is no doubt about the fact that no one in Austria wishes to bring about a war intentionally. The different interest groups which are a part of the peace movement are therefore not accusing anyone of malice but simply of crudely and recklessly endangering peace.

Our starting point for all further considerations is the following definition of peace: Peace is a state of general and total freedom from conflict and may not simply be viewed as the opposite of armed conflict among nations. Peace means a balance of contrasts and thus is virtually unattainable in human life by definition. For this reason, this (static) condition may be defined as absolute peace.

Peace, in everyday parlance, can only be relative (dynamic) peace. It can be a form of coexistence in which contrasts can be bridged and are at any rate not balanced out by force and where decisions are reached on the basis of substance and in consideration of all proposals for the solution of problems. That is why acceptance of democratic principles and groundrules is intimately tied to relative peace (which we will henceforth refer to simply as "peace"). This also calls for acceptance by representatives of the losing

side of an argument of the decisions democratically arrived at or at most their contesting these decisions by exclusively democratic means.

Peace thus signifies a special way of dealing with contrasting attitudes while adhering to the principles of humaneness and mutual respect. In this way, each individual is free to develop to his fullest potential. Peace is secured, if and when individuals are responsible enough voluntarily to limit their own freedom in the interests of communal life. Peace can thus be best attained by aiding and abetting such a sense of responsibility. This in turn bears a direct connection to freedom of choice because a sense of responsibility can only exist in decision-making processes.

The outermost limits of self-limitation are defined in the rights guaranteed under the Austrian constitution. Later, we will return to the issue of the use of force in order to defend these minimum freedoms in case of emergency up to and including risking one's life to do so.

Inside the peace movement, opinions tend to differ on how to attain this kind of peace. The method depends of course on how peace is defined in each instance. Dr Heinz Fischer, the fraction chairman of the SPÖ, cites as an extreme example of it the Latin proverb "si vis pacem, para bellum" (if you desire peace, prepare for war)¹. Fischer, for that matter, does not even exclude the possibility that there may be various kinds of peace.

"There may only be one kind of peace," Fischer writes, "and even that is not really certain. But there are a number of peace movements and there are even more recipes on how to safeguard peace. Leonid Brezhnev, the CPSU secretary-general, believes that his various proposals serve the maintenance of peace just as much as does President Reagan and as he proclaims in his television addresses. The Pope in Rome calls for securing peace and so do the predominantly young demonstrators in the capitals of Europe. The fact that the abovementioned are all saying the same thing although they probably mean something quite different in each case—that fact shows how diverse the ideas about peace and guaranteeing peace really are and how difficult it is to come to an understanding on this issue."

On the average, the young supporters of the peace movement often unthinkingly accept lines of arguments of certain kinds and, in the process, become unwitting proponents of whatever ideology it happens to be. Let us quote Hans Eichbauer, a member of the Upper Austria socialist youth organization.

"We have to start with some sort of principles," he said in the "No Holds Barred" TV show of 22 October 1982. "What is it that we consider worth defending? What kind of ideas about society—about my life in a community with others, tied to others—do I consider worth defending? This is so because I think that the peace movement is not just a movement that concerns itself with NATO modernization, with missiles and multiple warheads and megatons but because the peace movement really is a movement that one could almost describe as a movement of discontent. And beyond that because it contains a component that is tremendously critical of society. Large segments of the young population are sort of mulling things over and coming

to the following conclusion: On the one hand such and such an amount of money is being spent to build up and expand the armed forces. We want to have interceptors, possibly even missiles—even to the extent of altering the provisions of the state treaty. On the other hand, see for yourself: there is unemployment; there are no youth centers, no funds for collective child care. There seems to be no way of resolving the women's question, the issue of the role of women in society. Social services are being cut and so are student subsidies. And that is why I think it is justified—that entire critique of comprehensive national defense and even of the armed forces. When I think about it I reach the conclusion that the armed forces are being integrated into a comprehensive national defense system to defend a social system toward which we are critical; quite simply a social system in which it is possible that there is unemployment; that there are cuts in social services and so on.

And so, I really have to start the whole discussion with the question of what it is that I find worth defending. What does the society look like? And then I have to consider the question of whether the armed forces are actually acting the part of an obstacle; a barrier that stands in the way of this society as it opts for change or should I turn the argument around and ask myself whether the armed forces are not in fact helping me secure this very process of social change. Those are the lines, I think, along which the discussion would have to run."

Eichbauer does not appear to be familiar with the legal and military consequences of Austria's everlasting neutrality.² National defense as well as the armed forces seem questionable to him because he views them as protectors of a questionable social system. He starts out with the erroneous assumption that changing or possibly even doing away with national defense would automatically do away with the conditions he criticizes as well. But that is certainly not the case—however one may view the issue of national defense. In fact, it really looks as though Eichbauer's argument serves to foster an ideology which Eichbauer himself has subscribed to for personal reasons and to which he clings even though it is based on objectively false premises.

We should note in this connection that Austrian national defense is an apparatus that subsumes the citizenry, the territory and the constitution. It serves to protect these three entities and is subordinate to them but may under no circumstances be utilized to work social change. The sole purpose of national defense is to protect the conditions that have arisen on the basis of constitutional, democratic processes. Anything else could be misinterpreted as an invitation to conduct a putsch.

Leaving Eichbauer's ideologically tinted statement aside, we must also assume that he is sincerely worried about peace. His statement gives some major hints on how he views the goals of the peace movement. Eichbauer considers unemployment, the lack of youth centers and "the" unresolved

women's issue prototypical sources of conflict that must be removed because they are injurious to peace. He is motivated to a large extent by his concern about international conflicts. (Cf "Armed Forces and Peace Movement" in ZUKUNFT No 5/82)

Since peace is rarely defined with sufficient clarity, it is difficult to get an idea of the aims of the various peace initiatives. We will now turn to the various definitions used by different segments of the peace movement and then try to show what position the Austrian peace movement has taken on national defense and, for that matter, whether there is anything like a uniform position at all.

"Peace" in the Media—Definitions Used by Peace Initiatives

We looked into 500 reports and publications to obtain an overview of the definition of peace as used by the peace initiatives and covered by the media. We assigned greater weight to statements by prominent spokesmen of the peace movement and in public life (the actual truthfulness of the reports could not be verified in every instance of course) than to the lines of thought of private citizens such as were voiced in letters to the editor for example. This procedure seemed legitimate to us because present research on the impact of the mass media indicates that the influence exerted by opinion leaders (and the prominent persons must be taken as such in this instance) is of focal importance.³

As regards the Austrian peace movement, the following personages, among others, were designated as opinion leaders: President Dr Rudolf Kirchschlaeger; Chancellor Dr Bruno Kreisky; Cardinal Dr Franz Koenig; Peter M Lingens; Karl Semlitsch, a lieutenant-colonel of the general staff service; Major Dr Wolfgang Schneider; G Hoffmann-Ostenhof; Manfred Scheuch; Dr Stefan Rehrl; Josef Cap; Andreas Maislinger; Harald Eichbauer and Professor Alexander Tollmann.

Admittedly subjective criteria were used to designate the above as opinion leaders. But there is good reason to believe that a strictly objective examination of the entire subject matter would reach the same general conclusions as the statements enumerated below. Based on these premises, the preliminary outcome of the study of publications on the subject of "peace" may be summarized under the following three headings:

The peace movement does not constitute a solid bloc but consists of a large number of sub-groups. In most instances, these do without a sharply restricted and clearly formulated definition of peace. This poses a danger to the extent that there is a possibility that an obviously diffuse goal pursued by various peace initiatives might suddenly and simultaneously be targeted as a precisely defined political goal on the basis of the use of the appropriate outside stimuli. In other words, there is no way of excluding the possibility that existing internal weaknesses might be utilized for power political goals at any time.

The spectrum of definitions ranges all the way from peace in the Christian sense and peaceful contact among men as the basis of genuine world peace—as the Austrian president sees it—to the ban on certain types of armaments. One may start out by saying that the various definitions of peace provide some information on threat scenarios and that they are reflections of the political programs for countering these threats by means of whatever specific peace initiative. It is worth noting in this connection that Austrian peace initiatives address their appeals for disarmament more frequently to governments of democratic countries than to the totalitarian communist nations. We should take particular note in this connection of the Austrian Communist Party's views on peace where peace and (class) struggle are viewed as compatible.

"The fight for peace and peaceful coexistence is a class struggle: 'by stepping up the offensive against imperialism, decisive superiority over it can be achieved and imperialist policy directed to aggression and war can be made to suffer a defeat' was a precept contained in the main document on the international consultations of the communist and labor party. This gives proof once again that the struggle of the communists is in conformity with the basic interests of peoples in their national independence, their social progress and peace."⁴

Mostly those persons who represent Marxist ideologies demand the unilateral disarmament of the Austrian armed forces and in some instances even the abolition of that institution as such.

To present a well-rounded view of the Austrian peace movement, one must turn to its subsidiary features and the political power games surrounding it. Our findings can be divided into three main categories:

1. International political fields of force and their impact on the peace movement.
2. The peace movement's stand on the use of force as a means of pressing its demands.
3. The position of the Austrian peace initiative on the rule of law and to national defense.

Political Fields of Force and the Peace Movement

Examining the news reports, one can see that the Austrian peace movement and its attitude toward the government occupies an exceptional position internationally. In contrast to foreign peace movements, for example, foreign policy (except as concerns the issue of arms exports) is hardly ever criticized. This may be attributable to Austria's special position as a neutral country which has no alliances. For the sake of completeness and as an indication of political balance in the Austrian peace movement, let us cite a report carried by Austrian Television in its 12 December 1982 evening newscast which dealt with "members of the Austrian peace movement" wearing

face masks resembling the chiefs of state of the superpowers and demonstrating against NATO modernization and the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Vienna's inner city.

In the international context any assessment of the Austrian peace movement would have to include the question of whether the peace movement might possibly have been foisted on the West by the East and whether it is to be viewed as an instrument with which to apply power-political pressure. To tell the truth, a really clear answer—based only on an evaluation of the media study—would amount to pure speculation, no matter how it came out. But it is worth noting that neither the USSR, nor its satellites are making any effort to rid themselves of the well-founded suspicion that they are using the peace movement for their own ends.⁵

If one starts out by saying, for example, that the West is to be duped by means of targeted disinformation by the East, then one might very well conclude that the "information reaching the West" concerning Eastern guidance of the actions of the peace movement could also be part of that disinformation campaign. The information could then simply be viewed as veiling the true political goals which the West thus far has failed to detect.

Is the contention of the Eastern direction of the peace initiatives part of a malicious capitalist campaign of slander? But how then to explain the proven "slant" of the peace movement which virtually exists only in the West? How to explain that the Western peace movements just like the so-called peace movements in the East reserve their criticism for American and for NATO arms?

What we mean to point out is the uncertainty confronting any reasonably objective observer. If, for example, one substitutes the concept of the "victory of communist world revolution" for the word "peace" in any communist-oriented peace declaration, then one gets a startlingly unequivocal image which indicates that the peace movements do the bidding of Marxism-Leninism after all. Western politicians and diplomats are increasingly inclining toward that view as they point to any number of pieces of evidence that incriminate the entire East bloc and the USSR in particular.

In support of the credibility of the peace movements in the East, one might mention the fact that there are a great many front and auxiliary organizations of the communist parties whose avowed goal is world peace. But if peace is defined, as above, as a vehicle of the class struggle, then these efforts for peace are merely different forms of realizing the communist quest for power⁶—as the platform of the Austrian communists (cited above) clearly shows.

Walter Kreuzthaler⁷ is not convinced of the USSR's honesty, either. In commenting on the postwar history of East bloc journalism, he recalls that "'peace' was the struggle against the Anglo-American warmongers." As a specific example of the lack of truth contained in Eastern press statements, he cites a media report taken from the Cominform organ FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY founded in 1947. The piece starts out by saying: "When the great Russian inventor Popov gave the radio to the world..."

The justified criticism and suspicion of the Soviet Union appear almost petty in the face of the last statements made by chief of state and party leader Brezhnev, which contained the following observation among others: "We must bequeath to the coming generations a flourishing planet and not one rent asunder by explosions."⁸ Genadi Gerassimov, APN's foreign policy commentator, states that it was the United States which started the arms race. "The Soviet Union..." he writes, "kept on making proposals, however, to stop the race short of the abyss..."⁹

There are three things, however, that need to be said:

Particularly if it is true that the USSR and its satellites are militarily superior to the West, any unilateral disarmament of the West as the East is continuously demanding would be tantamount to political suicide. For that matter, unilateral disarmament on the part of the East could not be the subject of any serious discussion, either. Under these circumstances, the question of who started the arms race becomes superfluous.

Leaving these questions aside, there is a possibility in democratic countries to effect peaceful social change by means guaranteed in their constitutions. In nations which have communist constitutions, that is not possible.

Thirdly, no one is sent to a camp because of his political beliefs or is subjected to psychiatric treatment. But that is the case in the East bloc—and in fact these countries do not even deny it.

Overall then, the definition of peace as applies to the West—based as it is on the protection of freedom and democracy—appears to be the more reliable than the one given by the East.

Peace Movement and Use of Force to Influence Debate

The issue of the use of force on the part of the peace movement itself is a special aspect of the issue of possible threat scenarios. ("Is the peace movement a threat to peace ?") The stand taken by the peace movement toward the use of force as an expression of its views is no more uniform than the peace movement as a whole. Once again we must look at different trends—and in this connection it is hard to say whether someone actually is a part of the movement or an atypical individual case whose attitudes cannot be taken to represent the peace movement as such. That there are practical applications of this can be shown by the following example:

Between 5 July and 10 July 1982, the Austrian army ran an information show at Shopping-City-South. Starting some days prior to the event, there was public criticism of it—primarily by the "Moedling Peace Committee" represented by Father Quirin de Leeuw and the deputy mayor of Moedling, Mr Nikolay; by the Socialist Youth represented by Josef Cap; by the Civilian Service Association; by the national steering committee of the Catholic Youth of Austria and by the SPOe Young Generation.

The critique prior to the opening of the show already contained the demand—some parts of it in the form of an ultimatum—to call the event off. Josef Cap, for example, stated that "one will show one's displeasure in the course of an on-the-spot visit."¹⁰

The army show went ahead as planned and, as planned, the announced "visits" took place. The expressions of "displeasure" reached an initial climax on 5 July 1982 when army vehicles were spattered with paint by persons unknown¹¹—and civilian cars were damaged in a similar manner. This amounted to grave property damage which is not a mere peccadillo, if one considers the fact that an offense such as this calls for a prison term of up to 2 years. "Magister Rudolf B from Vienna" physically attacked and injured one of the servicemen. Some demonstrators were arrested for trying to paint swastikas on one of the exhibits.

These and a number of other "actions" which took place in the course of the army show are criminal offenses pure and simple and do not throw a peaceful light on the peace movement. Were these simply bad blunders on the part of individuals. The Moedling deputy mayor, for example, stayed "peacefully in the background," as the MOEDLINGER RUNDSCHAU put it while in the foreground a "horde" of demonstrators threw itself on the ground in peaceful intent. Does Nikolay belong to the peace movement—and the demonstrators perhaps do not?

To come up with any findings at all about such a complicated issue as the peace movement, one has to define one's terms:

1. A person belongs to the peace movement, if he comes out in favor of it; if he makes statements on its behalf or takes part in peace actions and if individual peace initiatives or individual notables who say they themselves belong to the peace movement do not distance themselves from that person.
2. Possible ways for the peace movement to express itself are a result of the specific purpose intended—i.e. they are tied to the event itself. Their limits are defined by the law of the land. If they break the law and disturb the peace which society has democratically established for itself and if they intend thereby to draw attention to their cause, then this will be defined as the use of force henceforth.

A definition of the concept of the use of force in conjunction with peace actions and a definition of membership in the peace movement are needed for the sake of clarity. But further discussion might show whether the limits as defined here ought to be drawn in some different way.

The concept of "force" presents us with a semantic problem once again because it is unclear in most instances exactly what the different peace initiatives mean by it. From the Marxist point of view, any disturbance of a social order established by constitutional, democratic means is virtually desirable, if the object is to hasten the worldwide victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Certain types of force and even certain kinds of wars are deemed permissible and just: the "wars of defense." There are also, in the Marxist-Leninist view, national wars of liberation and all wars to defend the socialist world system.¹² We need not further point out that this ideological precondition is reflected in the conduct of Marxist peace initiatives.

Based on the definitions selected and cited above, we may conclude that force—even including physical force in everyday parlance—was used on the occasion of the army show at Shopping-City-South. Since no segment of the movement publicly distanced itself from the "perpetrators of force", we must assume that these were acts perpetrated by members of the peace movement—or perhaps even acts which the initiators of the demonstration consciously planned. Those groups which are seriously concerned about peace must be blamed for not having publicly protested these acts immediately and denounced those responsible for them. They would have rendered an invaluable service to the peace movement as a whole by doing so because their protest would have weakened any negative blanket accusations.

However that may be—not everyone who demonstrated against the army and for peace was motivated by serious, peaceful intentions. If some of the peaceniks are unwilling to exclude violence as a means of expression in a controversy conducted along democratic lines, then they lose credibility.

Herbert Heinisch¹³ calls throwing pots of paint an appropriate means of discussion and justifies the use of such "arguments" as being based on "rage over the inexplicable." Rage is human. But true personal dedication to peace would seem to call for overcoming rage by rational means. Rage cannot be a true motivating force in the interests of peace until it has been conquered and transcended. As a motivating force for rowdies and punks it must be sharply rejected.

If one sticks to Heinisch's dubious explanation, then the peace initiatives in the FRG must be motivated by a special rage. Violations of demonstration bans are as common there as the damage of vehicles and the demolition of show windows and on occasion even street battles with the police.

Martin Jaenicke, the fraction chairman of the Alternative List—who used to write speeches for Willy Brandt and was on Helmut Schmidt's planning staff—distances himself from 'any type of violence,' to be sure—the exception being that the 'ultimate' took place, i.e. the modernization resolution became operative. In addition, he draws a distinction between 'violence against human beings' and 'violence against property' which he considers legitimate according to the one-time Extraparliamentary Opposition motto: 'make kaputt what makes you kaputt.'"¹⁴

Uncontested declarations of peace such as these throw an eerie light on the peace movement.

In Austria, conditions are somewhat different. Because of Austria's neutrality and the fact that there are no military alliances the debate is not as emotionally charged. But there is no denying that certain "argumentative techniques" have been taken over from abroad. The United Greens and the Alternative List, two parties just recently established in Austria, included only a very brief and non-committal reference to the peace issue in their party platform which otherwise focuses primarily on ecological issues. In the FRG, however, preventing NATO modernization is a central feature of the Greens' platform who, for that matter, are the political catch basin of most of the peace initiatives. The peace movement in the FRG lays no claim to political balance whatever (at least no such claim shows up in the media coverage). It is by all means recognizable as an organizational structure although no more than a start has thus far been made in efforts to obtain a uniform picture of the substance and the aims of the movement.

In contrast to the FRG, the Austrian peace initiatives do not possess a common, politico-organizational basis and there are no trends in that direction that can be seen at the moment. It would therefore be an injustice toward those people who are making an effort to achieve real peace, if they were placed on the same level as the gangs who perform criminal acts under whatever pretext—even if the cause be peace. But one should call on the "men of good will" in the peace movement to distance themselves sharply and above all publicly from the actions of these criminals.

Peace Movement, Rule of Law and National Defense

The preceding section pointed out that a kind of conflict situation has existed between the peace movement and the law of the land and we could also see that there is a close tie between peace and the rule of law. The main point is that law defines the principles under which conflict is dealt with (cf the definition of peace in the first part of this article). The Austrian constitution as the basis of our legal system must therefore be viewed as a system of peace. Reservations about specific laws have no bearing on this basically positive assessment of the situation. Every single legal standard, as it happens, has come into being in a democratic manner which is to say in recognition of all the opinions expressed. For this reason alone, the democratic principle as a form of government deserves our support because it is the only form of government which offers the guarantee that naturally occurring political controversies can be coped with by respecting—and in an ideal situation even by taking into account—all proposals for resolving them. Forms of government which are not equipped to do this—and that includes all other known ones—must be rejected out of hand for being non-peaceful. Therefore, we are faced with something of a problem if an authoritarian or totalitarian regime promises us peace which by definition it is not in a position to offer.

It also needs to be said that peace not only is the right of every human being but that it also entails a number of duties such as the exercise of certain democratic rights (e.g. the protection of minorities). It is only in this manner that democratic patterns of conduct may be practiced and kept alive and non-exercise of rights be avoided (such as in the case of a permanent refusal to vote).

The Austrian legal system which, as we said above, is a system of peace serves to protect certain values in a specific way. Protective mechanisms of various kinds are to guarantee that life, liberty, health and property—to name but a few of most important values—be left untouched under all circumstances. Self-defense and emergency help are provided for as a last resort in exceptional situations where normal protection no longer suffices.

The law says two things about self-defense against unwarranted attack: it speaks of individual self-defense of the single citizen and collective self-defense on the part of the state. Individual self-defense is defined by the penal code. Collective self-defense is defined as national defense and is outlined in greater detail in articles 9 a and 79 of the Austrian constitution and as to its specific goals in paragraph 2 of the armed forces law.

In most cases, self-defense and emergency help are considered to be binding. The law states that the duty to give help can be construed as a duty to render appropriate help in an emergency. In the case of public danger (such as explosives, radioactive material, poison or fire) the law explicitly calls on people to help and for legal penalties for the obstruction of self-defense or emergency aid measures. But the law also says that someone committing an otherwise punishable offense during an emergency may not have to face prosecution for it.¹⁵

The obligation to national defense is spelled out in article 9 a of the constitution as an active commitment and in article 9 (recognition of "accepted rules of international law" as part of the constitution) in connection with the neutrality law.¹⁶

Protective measures which involve violence but are designed to safeguard the values specifically protected under the legal system can only be taken—and the law is very clear about that—if all legal measures have been ineffective or could not be taken for lack of time. Military national defense is covered by special restrictions, since it constitutes the ultimate resort (under the conditions of comprehensive national defense).

The question of why collective self-defense in case of an attack on our country poses a particular problem for so many peace-loving people who otherwise support Austria's democratic social system is a difficult one to answer. Perhaps the psychologists might be able to tell us more about it. One reason that might be given for rejecting the concept of national defense is that collective self-defense must of necessity be centrally controlled

—a state of affairs which does not permit the individual to exercise any influence on or assume any responsibility for the type and extent of defensive measures for the execution of which he, after all, will be responsible. Without a doubt, this need for centralization does create some unjustified hardships in some situations; it can lead to casualties on both sides which might not be thought necessary by an objective, on-the-spot observer. But this line of argument may be answered by recalling that right and justice do not always gibe in other areas of life either but that no one would come up with the idea that the laws should therefore be called anti-social and be rejected in principle. The quest for approximating right to justice is a goal of democratic legal systems. An attempt is made to prevent injustice at all levels, including individual instances—and by and large it succeeds.

The debate concerning the introduction of the concept of social defense constitutes one such attempt to guarantee measured self-defense in the area of national defense. Many ideas—such as those of Galtung and Ebert—have been incorporated into the concept of comprehensive national defense on the basis of their undeniable logic. On occasion, the supporters of social defense called for including the concept of civil disobedience in the comprehensive national defense statutes. But this was not done so as not to drive the civilian population into an ultimately senseless martyr's death. But this much is clear: there is no chance for comprehensive national defense being abolished once social defense is introduced. A country committed to everlasting neutrality could make such a move only after the other countries have disarmed (because only that would exclude the possibility that its territory might be abused militarily by the warring parties).

The stand of the Austrian peace movement on these issue is split—with the split being recognizable even among organizational groups whose ideology is the same. While Cardinal Koenig, for example, constantly stresses the need and justification for national defense by citing the final protocol of the Second Vatican Council¹⁷, the left-wing Catholic youth magazine WENDE came out against just about anything in uniform.

As long as the word "soldier" is in some individual instances even being used as a synonym for the word "murderer" those young citizens are being disparaged who obey Austrian law and serve in the military. This type of "reporting" virtually calls on all readers subject to the draft "to discover their own conscience" and to say no to national defense by making them believe that national defense of any kind is of value only for those who have no conscience. The same lines of argument apply when statements by the SPÖ and the Association of Socialist Students of Austria are juxtaposed.

Of course there are some peace initiatives that adopt a positive attitude toward national defense as an integral part of the legal system and that are convinced of the defensive nature of that institution. But in many instances it is simply "chic" or "in" to be against it. In such cases, there is opposition to national defense even if one does not oneself know exactly what it is.¹⁸

Austrian national defense is charged with protecting our society against unwarranted attack. Since democracy is the only form of government which makes peace possible, the fact that the legal system provides for its defense is justified (even the communist countries protect their social system under their constitution). Austrian national defense does not stand in the way of peace but might in fact, under specific conditions, constitute a goal of concrete efforts toward peace. This also means that steps taken to prepare for defense are to be continuously debated and to be examined as to their efficacy. But any responsible person will not agree to relinquishing these measures unless and until his goal—which in this case is the maintenance or perhaps the reestablishment of the integrity of the state—is no longer open to doubt. Any other procedure aids and abets those political forces which benefit from a dissolution of democracy in Austria. But since democracy is a prerequisite for peace, its destruction would produce the exact opposite of what the peace movement wishes to achieve.

Summary

The above observations are intended as an overview of the Austrian peace movement. They are meant to show the many ways in which this movement is internally split and what the various goals are that it seeks to achieve. The peace movement in Austria is an amalgam which can only partially be evaluated; particularly in those instances—which are the exception to the rule—where organizational and substantive structures can actually be recognized. For these reasons, any sort of comprehensive evaluation of the peace movement is quite unthinkable.

In the peace debate, there are some situations and problems, however, which keep on cropping up and we will now look at some typical examples. "Dealings" with the peace initiatives and one's own estimate of them should be made dependent on the response to the following questions :

1. Does the peace initiative accept peace as the democratic-pluralistic way of life (which amounts to asking what the—political—goal is) ?
2. Is the peace initiative exerting an influence on the debate through the use of force ?
3. Is the peace initiative conducting the debate in a politically one-sided fashion (who benefits from the initiative aside from peace itself) ?

The same general questions can of course also be put to "loners" within the peace movement.

Peace not only consists of disarmament or the laying down of arms but is an expression of an inner state of mind. Any quest for peace which seeks to make communal life more humane and more livable as it holds on to the democratic social system deserves to be recognized and supported.

Leaving the question aside of whether the attempts at defining peace, violence and membership in the peace movement (cf above) have a claim to being binding—peace can only come from the individual; it can never be an exclusively collective undertaking because the latter is suited only to combating symptoms and thus remains confined to the surface of things.

This article represents an attempt to determine whether the peace initiatives within the peace movement actually conform to traditional ethical values as well as moral and legal standards and to report on the result of our investigation. From the Austrian point of view, peace and national defense are not opposites. On the contrary: both the comprehensive defense concept and the defensive nature of the militia-like plans for military defense of the nation are based on a very definite will to peace—which at the same time is a will to survive. Austrians are not more valuable than other people—nor are they less valuable. For this reason, the guarantee of survival—one's own survival and that of one's fellow man—is subsumed in the definition of genuine and lasting peace. All efforts for peace that are not characterized in this fashion are doomed to fail and will produce nothing but another variant of discord such as exists every day in authoritarian systems which only manage to stay in power by curtailing human rights and particularly by suppressing free speech.

To give peace a chance means to give freedom a chance and to make an effort on its behalf. This is what Heinrich Boell must have meant when he commented on Wolfgang Borchert's drama "Outside the Door":

"The 20 year-olds who take up this slender volume," Boell wrote, "may realize how valuable one's own opinions can be and how high the price is that one must assign to them."¹⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. Heinz Fischer, "Social Democracy and the Peace Movement" in ZENTRAL 5/82. Fischer's translation "...prepare for war" is not justified linguistically. The Latin original is more cynical. Based both on sentence structure and an assessment of Roman history, it may in fact be assumed that the Romans considered forceful pacification and punitive expeditions an effective way of securing peace.

2. In his pamphlet entitled "Social Defense and Civil Resistance" published by the Austrian Society for the Promotion of National Defense, Dr Heinz Vetschera points out that the everlastingly neutral state must see to it under the accepted rules of international law that its territory is not misused for military purposes by a warring party. But since military operations (including use of through roads by military units or the establishment of anti-aircraft and communications positions by a warring government) taking place on the territory of a neutral country are quite conceivable even as its social integrity remains untouched, Vetschera finds that a neutral country has an obligation to prepare for its own defense because that is the only way it can document its willingness to safeguard its territorial integrity. (Cf also A Verdross, "The Everlasting Neutrality of Austria," Vienna, 1980

3. Klaus Merten, "The Impact of Mass Communication. A Theoretical and Methodical Study," PUBLIZISTIK 1-2/82

4. Austrian Communist Party, "Political-Ideological Guidelines Adopted by the 22d Party Congress of the Austrian Communist Party, 18-20 January 1974, Vienna." Source: Albert Kadan/Anton Pelinka, "The Platforms of the Austrian Political Parties," St Poelten, Niederoesterreichisches Pressehaus 1979

5. Gert Schmidinger, "A New Kind of Pacifism" in NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 17 Aug 82 and INTEGRAL 5/82. "The Soviet Union did not invent the peace movement in the West and it would be an injustice toward most of its adherents to accuse them of consciously collaborating with the Soviet government. But for a long time the latter has been masterful in ferreting out opposition trends—wherever they may appear—and to take advantage of them for its own ends as a potential element in the class struggle. And that is how it is in this instance, too."

6. Hans Graf Huyn, "Countering Subversion, Neutralism and Pacifism," Second Annual World Balance of Power Conference, Leeds Castle, July 1982.

7. "Russian for Insiders" series, part XIII: Peace...in EUROPA, Nov 77

8. L Brezhnev, "To Safeguard Peace Is the Greatest Duty of Politicians" in SOWJETUNION HEUTE Jun 82

9. G Gerassimov, "The Peace Movements in the West and the Russian Public," in SOWJETUNION HEUTE Jun 82

10. Report on press conference and open letter by Socialist Youth to Defense Minister Otto Roesch in Austrian Press Agency 183-ID, 29 Jun 82

11. Examples are "Aggressive Peaceniks" in ARBEITERZEITUNG, 14 Jul 82; FPOe press release distributed by Austrian Press Agency on 20 Jul 82; "Demonstrators at Army Show Throw Selves on Ground" in MOEDLINGER ZEITUNG, 14 Jul 82

12. Pamphlet "Just War" published by Information Service of Catholic Working Group on Contemporary History," No 115, 1982. The author refers to General A Yerishev, "Ideological Instruction in the Soviet Armed Forces," Moscow 1978; German translation, Berlin 1980. Also, Alex Peter "The Military Doctrine Concerning 'Just War'" in BAYERN-KURIER, 31 Jan 76
13. "Pots of Paint Against Army Vehicles," letter to editor of ARBEITER-ZEITUNG
14. "The Anti-Party Party" in PROFIL 47/82, 22 Nov 82
15. Reference is to paragraphs 3, 10, 95, 176 and 187 of the penal code. Cf comments on same contained in Mayerhofer/Rieder (eds), "The Austrian Penal Laws. Part I The Penal Code," Vienna 1981
16. The accepted rules of international law make it incumbent on the everlastingly neutral state to make all the necessary efforts to prevent its territory from being used for military purposes by a warring party. On the basis of article 9 of the Austrian constitution, this rule is part of Austrian law as long as article remains in force. Cf also footnote 2.
17. "Anyone serving the fatherland as a soldier should consider himself a representative of security and the freedom of peoples. By fulfilling his mission properly, he contributes to genuine preservation of peace." From "Soldier and Peace," World Peace Day 1979, Defense Ministry, Vienna 1979
18. Cf "No Holds Barred", 15 Oct 82. In the course of a series of interviews conducted in connection with the 1982 territorial defense exercise in Kufstein, none of those questioned was able to give anything like a satisfactory response to questions about the meaning of comprehensive national defense. For this reason, the same program scheduled a panel discussion on this same topic one week later in order to make viewers more familiar with the issue.
19. H Boell, "Postscript" to W Borchert "Outside the Door," Hamburg 1956

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ULMAN EYES UN INEFFECTIVENESS ON CYPRUS ISSUE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 16 May 83 p 8

[Article by Haluk Ulman]

[Text] United Nations General Assembly talks on the Cyprus issue have been completed, and the decision drafted by the nonaligned nations has been approved by a vote of 103 to 5, with 20 abstentions.

It is reported that the large nations that are permanent members of the UN Security Council abstained from voting.

There is no great difference between this general assembly decision on Cyprus and the others that have been made since 1979. As is known, all of these decisions have sought the immediate withdrawal of foreign soldiers stationed on the island, a return of refugees to their former homes, the security council's investigation to determine whether or not these decisions are carried out, and the taking of measures if necessary. However, we understand from reports appearing in the press that, this time, a connection is being made between the withdrawal of foreign troops on the island -- Turkish soldiers, in other words -- and the success of talks between the communities, which have been viewed in every decision as the means to a solution. At least, this is the impression received from terms that are used. In addition, the security council is also being called upon in a more decisive tone than formerly to take measures.

In this decision, there is nothing lost by Turkey, which has now grown accustomed to this type of UN General Assembly position, but it certainly is not easy to comprehend what Greece and the Greek Cypriots gain from it. This is because solution of the Cyprus problem will come, not from decisions that cannot be applied by the United Nations, but from an agreement made with Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, and these decisions do not make agreement easier. They make agreement more difficult.

In fact, it is expected now that Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, by taking refuge behind the new decision, will break off talks between the communities and will recess talks until the Turkish soldiers leave the island. Very well, but who will be hurt by this? Turkey is not going to call back its soldiers on the island because talks have been broken off, for it is in the position of being sovereign in the southern part of the island. Turkish Cypriots live in security in this region. In

other words, the actual situation here favors Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the island. It must be the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots who are discomfited by a break-off in talks between the communities and by the consequent continuation of the situation.

They, however, hope that the United States Congress on one hand and the UN Security Council on the other hand will ensure that sanctions are applied against Turkey if it does not withdraw its troops from the island. More accurately, they are working to ensure this.

They must not become overly optimistic about this. In fact, the American Congress, under the influence of Greek-American votes in the United States, Greek-American money, and Greece, this year remembered again the Turkish soldiers on the island and has begun again to consider tying continued military aid to Turkey to the withdrawal of these troops. However, in contrast to this attitude of congress, the American administration undoubtedly well knows that the arms embargo that was applied previously for the same purpose did nothing other than harden the Turks and shake the security of the West by making Turkish defense powerless. It undoubtedly well knows that these negative factors have not been able to be eliminated even today.

Therefore, it will oppose this trend in congress and, if it is unsuccessful in stopping it, it will attempt to find another course of action. It should not be forgotten that, if one wishes to circumvent an embargo, there is more than one way to do so.

There remains the fact that, today, the Greek-American lobby and Greece are taking advantage of the existence of the temporary government in Turkey and are using the skill they possess in congress. After the transition to democracy is made, their efforts will take on another form.

Neither should anyone rely upon the UN Security Council too much. The fact that the large nations that are permanent members of the council abstained during voting in the general assembly should be a warning to the Greek Cypriots and to Greece. Today, both the United States and the Soviet Union support solution of the Cyprus issue by means of talks between the communities. They have openly committed themselves to this. And it is impossible to pass a decision to take measures, to enforce sanctions against Turkey without the vote of the United States and the Soviet Union, without the approval of the security council.

It is because of all this that the latest decision, as the previous decisions, of the general council appears to be destined to remain on paper. Greece and the Greek Cypriots should beware and should not attempt, by relying upon this, to do something that is wrong. In the end, they, themselves, will be the ones who get hurt.

11673

CSO: 3554/296

RENEWED RUMORS ABOUT IMPENDING MINI-RESHUFFLE

Personalities Targeted

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 10 Jun 83 p 1

Text The premier's repeated and long meetings at Kastri with his closest party cadre has reinforced in the past 48 hours the rumors that a "mini-reshuffle" is pending. The assumption by Greece of the EEC chairmanship does not permit the premier to undertake extensive changes at the ministerial level. It is, therefore, expected that the reshuffling will concern mainly deputy ministers and chairmen of agencies and banks. The only minister about whom there are persistent reports that he will be relieved of his duties is G. Moraitis while the positions of National Economy Deputy Minister I. Pottakis and Research and Technology Minister G. Lianis are reported as "very unstable." In all probability Commerce Deputy Minister Theod. Pangalos will also follow Moraitis' fate.

Also reported among those to be removed are National Economy Deputy Ministers And. Georgiadis and Dim. Dimosthenopoulos. Their removal as well as that of Pottakis is attributed to National Economy Minister Ger. Arsenis who, on the other hand, seems to thwart the removal of Finance Minister Dim. Koulourianos. Arsenis evidently wishes to share with the latter the responsibility on the course of the economic policy.

Finally, it is possible that the reshuffling may be accompanied by the announcement that a new Ministry for Planning may be established with Ap. Lazaris as its head.

Government Condemns Press

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Jun 83 pp 1, 2

Text Prompted by reports about a pending government reshuffling, Premier Papandreu accused the press of being unreliable during yesterday's meeting of the Ministerial Council. The premier attributed these reports to a New Democracy Party information dissemination center and this charge prompted the leader of the major opposition E. Averof to deny, most categorically, the accusations which he attributed to Papandreu's imagination.

In any event the premier's charges and the fact that the reports about reshuffling were channeled by government ministers are attributed to the government tactics of concealing inter-government disputes and the government's intention to impose strict measures for limiting the freedom of the press.

Those Being Removed

The "coincidence" is characteristically discussed of the reports about the removal of all those ministers who have occasionally aired their disagreements with the premier, but "events" have belied these reports since Avgerinos appeared on TV yesterday after the 9 o'clock news bulletin and explained what the Health Centers are!

The reports which said that Avgerinos had resigned added that his position would be filled by Interior Minister Gennimatas who this morning will also assume the chairmanship of the Union of Doctors of the Athens-Piraeus Hospitals. As a matter of fact, Gennimatas chaired all meetings of ministers and deputies who discussed the health draft law while Avgerinos sat in as a participant.

Papandreu's Statement

According to the government spokesman, at the Ministerial Council Papandreu said that "he believes that what is written about reshuffling is not accidental. Evidently some ND 'staff' channels such reports to the press for the purpose of shifting the center of gravity of the people's interest. It is not accidental that yesterday's strong rumor-mongering is taking place at exactly a period of economic progress. With such orchestrated rumor-mongering they are trying to create a climate of uncertainty, insecurity and disorientation. It certainly is a method of false information--they spread reports sometime about reshuffles and sometime about early elections. But such things paint a sad picture of the press which lately has not exhibited sensitivity about elucidation and reliability of information. The reporting of non-confirmed information hurts the Greek press which should, in competing for news, guard itself against unreliable news whose publication undermines its prestige. What I say does not mean that it concerns the adverse criticism of the government by the press however cruel such criticism may be. Criticism and scrutiny are duties of the press but publication of false information is unacceptable."

In response to questions on what has been published about the press, the spokesman said that the government has changed through an amendment to the Penal Law the provisions on reviling government authority, the ex officio prosecution and proof of truth through appeal to the right of duty performance. He added that the two articles about to be voted aim at neutralizing the consequences from published slanderous articles. One of the articles concerns the Greek character of the press and the other the protection of the citizen's individuality.

Dialogue With the Spokesman

In response to the question if the government or the premier had proof the ND had channeled the reports to newspapers friendly to PASOK, the government spokesman said: "The government has proof about this ND center. The fact, moreover, is that all newspapers published the same names."

Question Has RIZOSPASTIS ever fallen victim to such reports?

Answer It should not be excluded.

Question Does the government know that there were ministers who leaked reports and gave names?

Answer I don't believe it. The premier, moreover, had declared in the Ministerial Council that he did not think of any reorganization.

Question Could all these portend new government strict measures against the press since it's unreliable?

Answer We have explained what the two articles amendments to the Penal Law will include.

Question Could the unreliability of the press friendly to the government have an impact on the government reliability?

Answer The government is satisfied with its reliability and we are not concerned what the press does because we have the people's trust.

Averof

Averof's statement is as follows: "I deny in the most categorical way that a New Democracy staff or cadre channels information to the press about a government reshuffling. All these belong to Papandreu's imagination to which also belongs the claim that his government is on an upward economic march."

He does not have to glance at the economic indices in order to see that without exception everyone's on a downward march.

Every citizen can easily see who is attempting to shift the center of gravity of the Greek people's interests and who is aiming at its disorientation.

A man who tells lies will find them on his plate."

7520
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BENEFITS SEEN FOR PAPANDREOU IN NO AGREEMENT ON BASES

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 10 Jun 83 p 6

/Article by G. Karagiorgas: "The Bases"//

/Text/ It appears that the bases "serial" is in its last episode on the small screen of the large political stage. Moreover, it seems to have dropped to secondary importance following the meeting of our foreign minister with his American counterpart /sic/ Bartholomew while the premier's statement leaves no margin for postponement. The issue of the bases is being terminated and the Chamber of Deputies will be informed on the subject.

For some time now there were reports that the Americans have given us until the end of June to accept their proposal since they were not in a hurry to sign the new agreement because conventionally they can have 2 more years before removing their installations.

If one can judge from the results of the much advertised "moratorium" which has become an "oratorium" of complaints about the continuous Turkish violations, one would not have difficulty in guessing the outcome of the talks about the American bases. Those who believe in the signing of the agreement base their optimism--like the other European socialist parties--on the cooperation with the United States in the defensive sector and in the intensive behind-the-scenes efforts for getting some hundred millions of dollars which will give some relief to the depressed National Economy Minister Arsenis who also bears the economic responsibility for the Change. But the PASOK government, which for many people promises something only to take it back, muddles along, retreats, and thinks and decides differently has, on the contrary, studied in advance its every step. It has charted its course since the time it was the opposition party /in the Chamber of Deputies--a course based on philosophical theories. For an observer, this confirmation is so frequent that he has no margins to agree with those who believe that everything is left to chance.

Andreas Papandreu never had self-illusions. Despite his opportunistic acquaintances with other small or big leaders, he knows that he must remain firm in his relations with the United States. On the issue of the bases, if he thought the way his political adversaries want to pressure him, he could only ask the Americans to move their bases and go--the way De Gaulle

did when he left NATO, the way Karamanlis did when he withdrew from the military wing of the Atlantic Alliance.

There is no doubt that the Americans, albeit openly displeased, would readily conform with Greece's wish and today, instead of talking about the renewal of the agreement we would be witnessing their spectacular departure.

Government officials trying to explain the zig-zagging negotiations (which the coffee server of the Foreign Ministry counts in hundreds of coffees and cigarette butts) say with disarming frankness that the Americans were used to having the upper hand but now that "we decided to raise our hand also they (the Americans) are indignant." The officials justify the postponements as a natural time interval needed to tame the Americans!

Of course, no one can say for sure how much the Americans were tamed during the negotiations' game, a game some people insist on calling a "stage play." Let us assume that the agreement on the bases is not signed and that after 18 months, they will be removed from Greece. In such a case, shall we purchase the F-16 and F-18 aircraft? Where shall we turn for war material at the moment when the Turkish danger is lying in wait for the opportunity to find us weak? All military advisers of the PASOK government have not recommended even for a moment to disengage Greece from the American weaponry. This means that the presence of the United States and its influence in our defense and military training will continue even without the bases. Just as it happened after the fall of the dictatorship when we withdrew from the military wing of NATO and the American trainers remained in all training centers of the armed forces to the great surprise of the trainees. The only thing that changed when we rejoined the NATO military wing was a submission to the Turkish demands in order to make them lift the veto which they unexpectedly acquired when we withdrew /in 1974/.

Therefore, if the agreement for the bases is not signed, PASOK will derive important benefits. It will show that it kept its pre-election promises, its "contract with the people;" it will display force and determination; it will inspire its followers and will recover the trust of those shaken; at the same time, it will allow the American bases to stay for at least 18 months and during this period will prepare for the next elections having the advantage that it kept its promise to the people; it will have the right to boast about a national, independent policy, to use--and rightly so--the argument about a proud foreign policy and will use the slogan "Yes or No to the Bases of Death" during the elections. If he wins, there will always be a way to start again a new round of negotiations about the status of the bases--whether all should be removed or one only should remain. As is known, however, the Americans and NATO are mainly interested in maintaining one base in Crete which is vital to the defense of the West and which is nearer to the permanent anchorage of the Soviet Navy--not far from Kythira--with the Soviet surface ships, their defense support system, the missiles and the other types of weaponry the superpowers have.

Under these assumptions, the announcement whether an agreement about the bases is reached or not represents a political game--as the people have already sensed--rather than substance. Moreover, the extreme secrecy maintained during the negotiations proves that neither of the two parties felt the need to arouse public opinion in favor of its position. Perhaps because the solution had been predetermined.

7520
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STRIKES, PARTY RESPONSIBILITIES DOMINATE SITUATION

Appeal Made to Parties

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 30 Apr 83 p 4

[Article by Sotiris Kastopoulos: "National Issues, the Strikes and the Parties' Responsibilities"]

[Text] The week just passed was marked by two events with a broader political significance. The first was the strikes spreading to sectors which directly influence the rhythm of economic and social life and their effects on the political climate; the second was the statements made by the U.S. undersecretary of state and their effects on the course of the bases negotiations.

It is unnecessary for us to point out the criticalness of the period through which we are passing as regards our national issues. The Greek Government's policy is clear and has been repeatedly proclaimed by the prime minister. Despite the adverse international climate, Greece is waging battle for our national security, while determined to not make concessions which will harm our national independence.

It is obvious that, at this difficult juncture, a primarily significant issue is maintaining and strengthening national unanimity at the base of this government political line which is securing our national interests. Of course, national unanimity does exist to a very great degree at the level of the people; it will have to be declared equally decisively at the level of the political forces as well.

The argument that in this manner the government wishes to trap the opposition and tow it behind its choices is probably to be anticipated. The PASOK government has no such intentions. What it is pursuing, however, is for opposition to be exercised in a framework which, on the one hand, does not undermine the country's position and the national policy and, on the other, does not disarray economic and social life.

A realistic appraisal of the situation, as it is developing today, convinces one that the policy necessitated on the part of all the political forces is that which will respect the boundaries set by national expediencies. What remains unknown is how much will prevail a spirit of political maturity which corresponds to the criticalness of this juncture.

New Democracy, trapped in its contradictions and impasses and occupied with its internal disputes, does not seem able to rise to the occasion. Believing that a

policy of government erosion offers benefits to the Right, it loses no opportunity to devote itself to an aggressive, old-rightist type of rhetoric.

KKE Policy

As concerns KKE, after a period of restrained opposition, it appears to be orienting itself to hardening its stance. Playing a basic role in formation of this party's policy is reproduction and expansion of its influence both to the electoral body and social-class domain, as well as the level of power centers (Chamber of Deputies, local self-administration, trade unions, professional organizations, political associations, and it claims a share of government power, if possible!).

No one disregards the positions in a piece by the workers and their administrations who belong politically to the KKE area and have the syndicalist right to define their struggling tactics on trade-union issues, but not regardless of time and place.

However, it has been shown fairly often with the strikes that these always originate from "curious" alliances. They are always towed by KKE, which accepts the towage at whatever point in time "joint" oppositionary tactics against the government has been decided. From its own watchtower, ND always views--especially today--with a "good eye" KKE's influence in the area of various trade-union organizations, since ND itself has no power capable of activating the workers.

The present economic difficulties, unavoidable in a period of stabilizing the economy, are a fact that cause dissatisfaction and oppositions, particularly in the sectors of the workers ruled by a corporate mentality--those sectors which have connected the Change [Allagi] with economic offerings, with no inclination to share in the cost of a policy to restrain the Greek economy from its descending course, and then its recovery.

Strategy of Structural Alterations

The strategy and tactics of institutional and structural alterations, of which the country--aside from a trenchant government practice--has need, requires an active labor, and broader popular, movement. The government does not want the workers immobilized, nor does it seek their cheers and approval. It needs, from their organized struggling mobilization, the quickest effective promotion of the institutional changes it is adopting for our people.

But in a contrary way, we see the corporate spirit flourishing and pressures sharpening for economic demands which are exercised mainly by certain "free-vocational" areas. The KKE trade-union cadres and a large part of its party machine, because of their ideology and policy of dogmatic education, are becoming vehicles of these pressures on the government which loads them, in fact, with "anti-PASOK" nuances. This results in hardening KKE's stance and, by extension, aggravating the political climate with all the negative consequences, especially in this critical period.

Nevertheless, KKE must become aware that a policy of encouraging the spreading strikes, with a purpose of upsetting the income policy, is in danger of leading

to a justified government tactic--confrontation--as a measure to prevent the disarray of economic and social life. Labor agitation on the one hand weakens the national front vis-a-vis U.S. pressures and, on the other, impersonally favors the Right's plans. This is because, regardless of the strike organizers' intention, the strikes' spreading will nurture the pursuits of those circles systematizing destabilization.

All of us--especially the progressive forces--must be aware that we are in a period in which we ought to measure our actions and their political extensions.

Burt Visit Cancellation Versus Strikes

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek No 451, 29 Apr-5 May 83 p 15

[Excerpts] Facing the swelling wave of strikes, the government announced it would follow a tough stance and, through the government representative, it expressed a veiled threat about abolishing the right to strike; this signified a political mobilization of all the strikers to protect the public which is being tormented by the continuing strikes.

However, what roused particular attention was the government representative's insinuation about "strange alliances" and his statement that "for the sake of all of society, it is necessary to take measures which are probably not in harmony with certain principles but, for the sake of these principles, we cannot play the game of the Right and the establishment."

The words about "strange alliances" does not refer in the least to the Right which has no involvement in the wave of strikes; they mostly concern the extreme Left which has combined the strike pressure at the government's expense with its well-known implacable position on the bases issue.

This was all said on Saturday, 23 April, at noon and published in the Sunday newspapers. It was considered certain that on Monday morning, government measures would be announced. But instead of what was anticipated, other things happened which completely upset the scene.

The U.S. undersecretary of state, Mr. Burt, was going to come to Athens from Ankara for a definitive explanation with the Greek Government on the bases issue.

At that moment, the Athens government was under stifling strike pressure, kindled skillfully by KKE; at the same time, it was facing the need for a definitive explanation of the bases issue, on which the journalistic organs of the extreme Left and KKE followed an extreme position.

Mr. Papandreu was in the dilemma of either talking with the U.S. undersecretary when the KKE's position would harden, or avoiding such a meeting and maintaining an implacable position vis-a-vis the United States, and, at the same time, "delaying" implementation of the tough measures against the strikes.

Mr. Burt's strange statements in Ankara gave Mr. Papandreu the desired solution.

Laying aside the bases issue, refusing to receive Mr. Burt and appealing for national unanimity, he appeared on television Monday evening, 25 April, to brief the Greek people, but in reality to tame KKE. And, naturally, despite the threats on Saturday and the PASOK Executive Office's maxims, the tough measures were "delayed" and G. Arsenis undertook the role of speaking with the strikers, but without pressuring them.

So Mr. Papandreu's stance is tough but not absolute. Because, as political observers noted, the prime minister left a door open. He did not come to a definite break with the United States, but, waiting for the storm to pass, he is not confronting, at least directly, the KKE's pressure--which still exists, however.

9247
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POLITICAL

GREECE

GRADUAL RAPPROCHEMENT IN ND, PASOK POSITIONS SEEN LIKELY

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 May 83 pp 1,3

[Text] It is reckoned that the two great parties' rapprochement on foreign issues, which has been necessitated by events, is creating the temporally indispensable, firm and unchangeable framework within which not only will a credible general Greek policy be exercised, but also the activity of Greece's productive potential will be developed. This optimistic viewpoint was expressed by authoritative political observers, assessing recent, but also logically anticipated, developments in the great national issues, principally the pending issues of the bases, the EEC and the Greek-Turkish dialogue. The same observers noted that the coming weeks are considered a decisive period for affirmation of the country's permanent political orientation. And, to the extent which the government's present political practice has developed in the direction in which it apparently is being routed, it will contribute to reacquiring our credibility abroad and forming a climate of trust domestically.

Regarding this, it is noted that, after successive shiftings and retrogressions which shook Greece's international credibility and caused a deadlocked crisis of confidence at home, the PASOK government, after 20 months in power, appears to understand that it must support firm choices and turn to permanent goals for Greek foreign policy. This fact, if consummated, is considered doubly significant, first because such an exercise of foreign policy would put an end to suspensions which began with the uncertainty about PASOK's intentions; and, second, because PASOK's adaptation to Greece's permanent political orientation removes in advance any anxiety about eventual waverings and "changes in course" when the parties in power rotate, given that the goals pursued by the government today are primary choices of the second great party, to which, in fact, New Democracy routed the country amidst a very tough--at that time--opposition.

Phrasal Acrimonies

Today, despite phrasal differences and acrimonies, the two great parties in Greece--with the government practice which was followed by ND and which PASOK is apparently thinking of following in the future--are seeking to create and secure the following framework: Greece is reactivated as a full and equal member of the European Community. With the review of the status of the bases impending, Greece continues to grant facilities. It anticipates--propounding the same arguments with either an ND government or a PASOK government--settlement of the pending issues with NATO and it resumes the dialogue with Turkey, aiming at relaxing the tension in bilateral relations.

It is observed that the evident rapprochement of PASOK aims on foreign policy issues to ND's basic choices absolutely corresponds to the firm demand of the overwhelming majority of Greeks; this was very often expressed with the viewpoint, stated mainly by various factors of the country's economic life, that it is necessary to secure a wider political accord as a durable base for economic recovery. And it will undoubtedly help in eliminating the anxious question which stops all activity, "Where is PASOK going?". It is additionally noted that the rapprochement of ND and PASOK aims:

1. Ensures the widest possible accord to the primarily significant area of foreign policy in its exercise by each government, without blunting or changing the governmental responsibility of the party in power.
2. Creates, in the long-term, the prerequisites for change in the political scenery by crystallizing the principal points of the general policy where national unanimity is actually being expressed and noted.

Contradictory Phenomena

Contrary to what would be expected, the rapprochement of ND and PASOK viewpoints on the great national issues is not accompanied, at least for the present, by an analogous blunting of acrimony in their confrontations. Not only this, but an increasing loading of the political climate is being observed, with the mobilization of stereotypical criticisms which are attributed to the two parties being unprepared to substantialize the evident confrontation--necessary for the democratic regime's functioning--between them.

PASOK, on the governmental level, has engaged lately in a clear effort characterized by an advancing hardening of its stance toward New Democracy. The sharpness of PASOK's political expression, as is characteristically noted by political observers, is directly analogous to the degree to which it shifts its policy to ND's basic choices.

On the party level, PASOK is clearly showing signs of uneasiness, fearing reactions from its left wing. In addition, there is observed in the government faction an unprecedented and peculiar discord in the political behavior of government and party: The government, shifting its policy to the center, is seeking support for it from the people through its party machine. However, it is unable to mobilize the leftist masses by using standardized party slogans which are now coming into diametrical opposition with the present government aims.

Many observers of the country's political and economic life believe that the expected finalization of the bases agreement and success of government talks with the European Community will be a landmark which will put to the test this peculiar "equilibrium" of the government positions and the party machine's slogans.

From such a viewpoint, clarification of government-party relations begins to seem not only inevitable--especially under the KKE's criticism which is expected to escalate progressively on both foreign and economic issues--but also indispensable for formation of a new political physiognomy for PASOK which will be logically connected and consequential to the goals pursued by the government.

New Democracy Tactics

On its part, New Democracy appears equally unprepared to adopt a substantive confrontation of government work. Up to now, the official opposition has adopted and used as a basis for its criticism PASOK-KKE collaboration, with the result that its charges are refuted in actuality, particularly in the foreign policy sector where developments are depicted which appear anything but resultants of such a bipartisan collaboration.

A second point of criticism used by ND is PASOK's continual shiftings. It is noted by many ND factors that this criticism is finally becoming ineffective. This is because--as happened with criticism of the prime minister's recent interview--ND appears to be censuring PASOK because it is conforming its policy to ND's own policy. That is, unless a new PASOK retraction to its original extreme positions justifies supporters of this tactic.

Renovation of ND's political expression has been the principal demand of the official opposition's cadres and adherents since the day after the electoral defeat. But, as many ND factors point out, this new political expression did not come. On the contrary, ND's criticism was crystallized in oratorical schemes. Moreover, the rapid and unexpected decay of the government gave ND the illusion that the electoral gains it won in the 1982 municipal elections were due to the successful exercising of opposition.

Already, however, more and more cadres from the official opposition are supporting the viewpoint that a substantial and radical renovation of ND's political physiognomy is essential more than ever today when it has become clear that laying claim to the government will not come from affirmation of the party's electoral power, or from taking in displeased PASOK members, but from the mass coalition of voters from the traditional center.

Based on this reasoning, the same factors maintain that ND's new political expression must be turned to the center area where PASOK is already converging. And it must have as a base, and main argument, the effective exercise of government power by a party which does not waver between opposing "strategic choices" and "tactical goals."

9247
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WARNING TO PRIME MINISTER IN OPEN LETTER

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek No 451, 29 Apr-5 May 83 pp 7, 10

/Unsigned editorial: "Open Letter to the Prime Minister"/

/Text/ Our people are following developments in Greek-American relations with agony and fear --yes, fear, if we want to be sincere about it.

With agony because they know that any further aggravation would have direct consequences on the life of the country --and they do not want that.

With fear because they feel that if the overall concern were to shift more eastward and the neighbor lying in wait were to be greatly strengthened, then the only outcome would be for us to once again dance the Zalongo dance... And before all of us those of the frontier islands about which a Turkish poet wrote just a few years ago:

A golden glow burns on yonder opposite mountain. Strange!
In its midst there sits a damsel with weeping eyes.
I am not cruel, just one extension,
An extension yet of Aivali.
Wait for me Mytilini, one whom I have known since 1455.

(Skuru Eltsin, in the periodical TURK KULTURU)
Published in I KATHIMERINI, 10 April 1983

And further on:

You come back to my thoughts, rosy Kastellorizon,
You there, I here, how shamed am I.
My nostalgia for Rhodes burns in my heart.
In Samos, the lantern that was lit by
Tzaka Bey awaits me in that port.
It is Kos that awaits the earthquake
That comes from a 400-year journey.
Today, to whom does the place, where my flag
Once waved, belong.....

We must at once inform you that this agony and these fears of the people were not dispelled by your appearance on television but were augmented. This was so not so much because the 1-minute "briefing" did not contain any facts as much as the people felt that it was evidently done to bypass the briefing of parliament where by necessity the counterspeech would have been heard.

And it is this acknowledgement, the evident and continued weakening of the role and task of parliament, that is of concern to our people. This gradual disdain of parliament that we have become accustomed to consider --even though it is not always equal to the occasion-- as the altar of democracy. Now, therefore without altars?

Mr Prime Minister,

During difficult moments our people are indeed of the same mind. And in those moments that decide their fate they stand strongly united. However, for this to happen, for them to rise to higher levels, they must above all be convinced that they are right. Are you sure that today with the policy being exercised you are properly leading them? Are you sure that this policy is being accepted and approved by the people?

We will honestly speak our minds as we usually do on every important issue. And we will do so straightforwardly and mercilessly because we have arrived at a point where we must above all explain ourselves.

PASOK's policy, your government's policy, the policy you formulated inevitably leads to national crisis and internal anomaly. And it must be revised and once again find approaches to national cooperation. If continued, it will only deepen smouldering dissensions, the first and necessary step for every form of deviation to come about.

The feeling today is widespread that we are facing a new crossroads for making choices. Greece's traditional relations are being re-examined. Some other searches have been discouraging. And there is a very great danger that we may suddenly find ourselves tragically alone face to face with the open mouth of the wolf.

A short time ago the desperate and heroic resistance of the Palestinians in Beirut that started out with so many offers of help showed that at the hour of trial the other peoples --brothers, allies, spectators-- were suddenly afflicted with hearing difficulties.

What happened with Cyprus? Who moved to save the legitimate order? What is happening in Vietnam and Cambodia?

And while international practice --entrenched behind that other great inhuman injustice of our times, the balance of international relations, i.e. a partition of the spheres of influence between two landholders-- is what it is, Greece is frenzied with enthusiasm midway between two worlds, having the impression that it continues having those virtues that the gods had at one time bestowed on her...

Mr President, for some years now, with the will of the people --once we had labored much to have ourselves accepted-- we are equal members of a European family and a defensive alliance. We sought this because we believed that by being near them we would be at ease. And we were despite the bitter moments we went through and still are going through. Unfortunately, the values that we supposedly were the custodians of have ceased being recognized and their place taken by the imposition of force and technology. But even where we are --you will agree-- is preferable. Because examples from other sides are many and are to be avoided.

So, we have found this time to pitch our tents elsewhere. Where? And are you sure that there where we will find ourselves we will have the means to better defend our national and popular interests?

Because watch out: You have often said and it is really true that Greeks claim nothing from no one. But they do not intend to give up even an inch of land, air or sea to anyone whatsoever. Are you sure that only there where we will find ourselves will we be able to make a go of it?

The issue's vast significance, however, cannot be permitted, of course, to be weighed by your choices and decisions. Because when you were called on to govern the country, you, above all, undertook the self-evident obligation to hand it back at some point the way you found it. The issue of choices, friends and allies --even enemies-- is not a issue of a transient majority --if it is assumed that you do maintain it today-- but of the overall leadership.

If, despite this, the creation of some faits accomplis is undertaken, if some reorientation is planned without the knowledge of the country's leadership, then it should be remembered that responsibilities will be sought and attributed.

Because no one can play with the agony, well-being and freedoms of the people with impunity.

5671
CSO: 3521/302

POLITICAL

SPAIN

PCE LOOKING FOR MUNICIPAL ALLIANCES WITH PSOE

Gonzalez Asked to Begin Talks

Madrid YA in Spanish 11 May 83 p 8

[Article by Manuel Puig]

[Text] The communists took the initiative yesterday, proposing to Felipe Gonzales, president of the government, that he receive their secretary general, Gerardo Iglesias, and begin conversations concerning possible municipal alliances. This was announced in a press conference by Enrique Curiel, vice secretary general of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], who confirmed the decision of that party to form municipal alliances with other progressive forces and, specifically, with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party].

In an early evaluation of the results of the 8 May elections, it is believed that there has been a change in the two-party system and that the loss of 2.5 million votes by the PSOE, compared with the 28 October elections, signifies "a warning--calm, but firm--to the Spanish people concerning the government's attitude on certain questions of national policy."

Influenza prevented Gerardo Iglesias from making this early appraisal of the results of the recent electoral contest, in which the communists regained 600,000 votes, a victory due, in the opinion of the communist secretariat,--which observed with deep satisfaction, but without appearing over-triumphant, that "the PCE's recovery has begun,"--chiefly to the hardworking spirit of the members and the fine work the communists have done on the municipal level in the past 4 years.

In yesterday morning's meeting of the PCE Central Committee's secretariat in preparation for next Saturday's Central Committee meeting, it was decided to reiterate the PCE's support for the socialist government, a policy which responds to the profound demand for a truly progressive change, while at the same time recalling the points emphasized by the communists throughout their electoral campaign: the need to draw up a plan of national solidarity

against unemployment and for a referendum on NATO. In this latter regard, they announced that they are continuing to collect signatures demanding that Spain get out of NATO and that they have planned demonstrations for the end of May or the beginning of June in Madrid, Zaragoza and Rota protesting the ratification of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Spain and the United States.

After declaring that the PCE's recovery began after the last party congress and without mentioning the personal role of Gerardo Iglesias in that recovery, Enrique Curiel centered his talk on the municipal pacts, as well as those with the autonomies, which his party will propose to the PSOE. The PCE sees the pacts as overall agreements whose scope goes far beyond the election of mayors and councilmen, "especially when the city councils are advocating a profound change in the Local Government and Local Financing laws."

The communist in charge of municipal policy, Juan Jose Pla, said in a brief speech that 80 percent of the communist mayoralties have survived, and that the PSOE may need PCE support to keep its majority in the city councils of Barcelona, Caceres, Palma de Mallorca, Oviedo and Toledo. Finally, Enrique Curiel praised the "intelligence of the professors," who have come out in favor of having the communists participate in running the Madrid city council.

PSOE-PCE Collaboration Necessary

Madrid YA in Spanish 11 May 83 p 19

[Article by Angel del Rio]

[Text] With the municipal elections out of the way and the Madrid city council not yet officially constituted, the atmosphere is beginning to heat up with regard to what kind of government the PSOE plans to carry out for the next 4 years and, more specifically, whether this municipal government will find room for the small representation won by the PCE. At his press conference on election night, Mayor Tierno Galvan stated that he personally was inclined toward having the communists participate in the municipal government, although he indicated that it was a decision to be made by the leadership of both parties, since he "is simply a member."

Adolfo Pastor, who headed the slate of communist candidates for the Madrid city council, said yesterday that he would try to arrive at an agreement, rather than a pact, with the PSOE, through a possible concurrence in the two plans for action, which would permit cooperation in the tasks of government.

Meanwhile, Jose Acosta, president of the Madrid Socialist Federation, told EFE yesterday that the PSOE is willing to come to agreements with other

political forces in those municipalities of the province in which an absolute majority was not attained; these number about 30, including the capital, Madrid, where opposition in the city council is very strong.

Lorenzo Hernandez, communist candidate for the Madrid autonomy, told the same agency, with regard to this matter, that the PCE will not accept isolated pacts with the PSOE only in certain city councils in the province. "The PSOE is going to have problems governing in many city councils where it has received an absolute majority for the simple reason that its candidates are weak." In the final analysis the heads of the two parties, Felipe Gonzalez and Gerardo Iglesias, will have to decide.

The voice of opposition in the Madrid city council was also heard in statements to EFE by Jose Maria Alvarez del Manzano. "Our opposition will be strong, but not obstructionist. We will exercise some control over the municipal government team, presenting alternatives to its proposals."

According to our information, the three seats on the Madrid city council will be occupied by socialist councilmen, as well as the seven major areas of municipal government.

Another question that arose during the electoral campaign concerns the possible opening to the public of the permanent committees. These committees were opened when the corporation came into the city council; it is now out, and they have been closed for almost a year. As far as we have been able to learn, the permanent committees will continue to be closed to the public, because the Local Government law being drafted by the PSOE so specifies, thus prohibiting the long-heralded opening.

8735

CSO: 3548/410

AGUIRRE ON POSTELECTORAL FACTS IN BASQUE AREA

Madrid ABC in Spanish 18 May 83 p 25

/Commentary by Deputy Marcelino Oreja Aguirre: "The Basque Facts" /

/Text/ Of all the possible combinations following the municipal elections, those which most concern the commentators relate to the municipalities and deputations of the three Basque provinces. This is natural. One finds there such peculiar characteristics and such an immediate linkage to regional elections that to outline the political context as of now can prejudge the outcome of the Basque parliament's makeup to be formed in the spring of 1984. And with parliament, the /Basque/ community government and consequently the decision of who will occupy Ajuria Enea within the next 10 months.

So far the role which the nationalists of HB /Popular Unity/ and PNV /Basque Nationalist Party/ with all their different characteristics play there is sufficiently clear. The role of the Left has also become evident with the latest moves of the EE /Basque Left/, of the communist party--almost insignificant there--and of the powerful Socialist Party which seems to be consolidated in its traditional fiefs. However, the political trend which has failed to become consolidated so far is that of the Center Right which is a very distinct alternative to what could be a hard and untamed Right, naturally present there but one that is not only residual but in many cases exists also outside of the region.

Today I would like to focus on this option which is neither nationalist nor Socialist since I observe quite a bit of confusion in commentaries, stemming undoubtedly from this lack of a clear platform and strategy on the part of the Center Right coalition, resulting in confusion among analysts and voters and consequently a progressive slide in voting results which, for all that, do not reflect, in my opinion, the wishes of a significant portion of the electorate.

The first question I raise about the Basque issue is to determine what is the existing situation in the three provinces.

Initially I note the crisis and tension which will obviously last a long time. The lifestyle, the social habits are constantly being conditioned by revolutionary action which operates on various fronts--labor, social, and cultural--and which terrorizes the people and restricts their freedom.

Another factor is the economic-social crisis, with low industrial profitability and an unemployment level that is higher than average in Spain. There is underutilization of plant capacity, weakness in demand, a drop in exports, and financial difficulties. Resulting from this situation, naturally, one finds terrorism, blackmail, the imposition of revolutionary taxes, constant instability, and incitement to which the general recessionary causes affecting the rest of Spain also contribute.

A third element impacting, too, on the existing situation is the exacerbation of nationalism: At times the pressure of radical Basque irredentism; at others the exaltation of bourgeois nationalism with electoral goals. It is the generation of frustration in relations with the central Spanish Government, whatever its coloration, opposition to synchronizing with the other peoples and, especially, the conscious expressions which inconvenience other Spaniards, seeking the obsessive affirmation of an identity which, incidentally, already exists and should not require the repetition of superfluous acts.

But there is also a fourth factor which, in my opinion, is extremely important and which is rarely mentioned in Madrid. I refer to the growth of ambiguity, which very often the central government itself has exacerbated in its dialogues with the Basque authorities. Now that there is so much talk of "political limits" we do not know which is the nationalist parameter, but neither has the Basque Government found it pressing to define it. It goes without saying that organs of the state security forces and those of the autonomous police are involved. Peripheral administration is excessive in a proper state organization when a structure is being built which overlaps that belonging to the community when it should practically disappear except to man those organs which continue to be those of the central government's administration. In the last analysis it is the transfers /of authority/ which must now be settled to solve problems such as the determination of the definitive limits, to recognize the Basque Government's capacity of decision with respect to the budgetary allocations relative to new investments, and to assess correctly the Basque presence in Spain's interterritorial Compensation Fund. All this derives either from the Constitution or from the /Autonomy/ Statute and there cannot be indefinite delay in the solution of some problems which becloud the real resolve to allow the functioning of an autonomous entity such as the Basque Government. Because of historic imperatives this entity was granted special consideration in the drafting of the Constitution and in the establishment of economic arrangements and those of the criminal police.

And to defend these rights the PNV is not enough. We know already that the Socialist Party in the past supported Basque demands but this was for strictly opportunistic and isolated reasons, distorting its own centralist and unifying ideology. However, there are many men and women in the Basque Country who are not Socialists but who do not accept the nationalist identity either and who nevertheless feel they are as much Basques as anyone else because they are so by origin, birth, or by choice, and who do not want to belong to a branch of a nationwide party.

These are men and women who know that the inclusion of Alava, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya Provinces in Spain's grand political design was made possible through the autonomy of the legal system and the respect for a people's own idiosyncracy without any of this being an obstacle to the Basques; individually and collectively, coexisting and laboring with the other Spaniards in a common design throughout our country's history.

These are men and women who do not accept in any way that the peculiarities of their Basque history be muted but who seek to reassert them and define them in their own reality, who defend a legal system which does not imply the use of outdated provisions in their literal content, whose very effectiveness has changed in line with historical circumstances, and who call for the defense of their real political significance: A way of shaping the peculiarity of Basques within the unity of Spain.

These are men and women who desire a change, now more than ever, in ethical, social, and spiritual values enabling us to get the Basque Country moving.

These are men and women concerned with reevaluating the role and function of the various elements of our society: The businessmen who have meant so much for our country's development; the workers who have been the true driving force and exemplar of our development; the intellectuals, professionals, and even, naturally, those in charge of law and order. And in this matter I refer both to officials of the state security corps and forces such as those in charge of the autonomous police because all of them must deserve our esteem and our respect.

Finally, these are men and women who defend the promotion, reactivation, and use of all the Basque-language mass media, respecting the liberty which every citizen has to express himself in his own language, but also defend the generalized use of the Spanish Language as the language of all citizens of the Basque Country and, furthermore, as the official language of the Spanish nation.

These are some of the ideas suggested to me by the reports that circulate these days regarding agreements and pacts and the diffuse commentaries about the coalition of the Center Right, with concern that there may be a trend to radicalize and tense up Basque society and divide it into two communities of opposite persuasion.

However, between an exclusivist nationalism and dogmatic Socialism there exists, undoubtedly, that slot for a Center Right coalition which must fit into discrete organs supporting a regional organization with a clear leadership, an effective structure, and a defined ideology that defends itself against the pull of those who seek to distort it and place it in the area of Rightist intransigence, in socialist "Spanishness," or in the national socialist model, depriving it in any case of profile and personality.

This is not the way. The already existing option should highlight clarity and rigor so that it may appear as an appropriate alternative, differentiated, different, the heir of tradition and legal essence, capable of harmonizing freedom, justice, and progress, protecting the family, promoting savings and free enterprise, insuring freedom of education, enhancing the personality and voice of the historical territories, and feeling completely at one with the purest form of Basque-ism--something which cannot help reaching the most authentic concept of Spain.

This is the option demanded by the Basque Country, which is already on the move, but which needs to expand with the inclusion of men and women who, from a position of freedom from political filiation but with basic ideological alignment, seek to contribute to its consolidation in the face of the forthcoming autonomous elections in order to be the true alternative that would break the existing tension of the two communities in confrontation. In the meantime, at the municipal elections, let them keep away from any generic pact and let their sympathizers cast their votes in each municipality and province according to what is advantageous to the grand design that they have for the future. This, at least, is my opinion regarding the Basque pacts.

2662
CSO: 3548/419

TURKEY

SOSYAL ON COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 24 May 83 p 2

[Article by Mumtaz Soysal: "Sunny Relations"]

[Text] Turkish businessmen at a French resort on the Anatolian shores of the Aegean, trying to explain the problems of the administration in Ankara to European journalists, authors, parliamentarians and industrialists...

Considering the wide variety of people who have assembled for the annual Rotary Club regional meeting, plus the significance of geography, as well as the color added by the wide range of thinking, you cannot help but ponder the new dimensions taken on by relations between world societies today. We live in an era in which state-to-state diplomacy lags far behind, in which it has become impossible to make such matters as who will perform what task, where he will perform it and how he will perform it fit the rules. You may once have thought that explaining Turkey's problems to Europe and seeking understanding there was the job of the officials in Ankara or Strasbourg and you would have pictured this taking place in dour buildings, in darkened conference halls furnished in green baize tables and leather chairs. Now, just look. These matters, like a flood-tide before which no barriers will stand, have broken free of the bonds of institutions and rules and shifted to the beaches of Kusadasi, to the sun-splashed amphitheaters of summer resorts, to luncheon tables shared in laughter and pleasantries. The Rotarians, with their motto of "Service before Self," have this year made this service a spoke in the wheel they keep turning each year. They could well have said, "What's it to us?" But, obviously, they were unable to resist the spirit of the times which holds everyone a little responsible for everything.

Perhaps it is better this way: conducting promotional efforts, in which other sorts of official propaganda might be off-putting, by means of private, voluntary organizations while delegates enjoy themselves, relaxing, vacationing, eating and drinking.

The other part, the one that must be done through official channels, is obliged to stay in the background at all times, not drawing attention to itself. Otherwise, it does more harm than good.

However, from the standpoint of efforts that private circles can make, Turkey is doomed for some time yet to the inward-orientation, the seclusion of the past: A society which for years on end has had so many doubts and misgivings barring or making it difficult for its people to reach out beyond its borders cannot expect too much from the initiatives they are able to launch as individuals or groups today. Even members of the Rotary Club, whose basic distinction is its "international" approach, complain about the formalities reaching all the way to the Council of Ministers involved in establishing foreign contacts and ties.

Nevertheless, it behooves us to stop and compare the good that all these formalities, this tight oversight and red tape can do for the country with the harm caused by timidity and delaying an outward reach: Which is better? If our people, whether as professional organizations, unions and associations or even politicians, journalists, lawyers and industrialists, were free to establish relations with similar organizations and individuals elsewhere in the world, what would Turkey gain by it, what would it lose?

More precisely, if there are adverse consequences of foreign ties, are the current formalities, oversight and obstacles sufficient to prevent them? If they are inadequate to do so, is the correct thing to introduce more formalities, oversight and red tape, or to eliminate all of them entirely?

Considering the advantages that freedom under the Aegean sun may have garnered for Turkey even in a brief conference of only a day or two, it is automatically clear that going about everything with full candor in the bright light of day and establishing as extensive a range of relationships as possible is the superior way.

8349
CSO: 3554/303

NEW PARTIES EMERGE ; REGISTRATION PROCEDURES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 May 83 pp 1,11

[Text] Ankara--The formation of new political parties began today, 580 days after political party activities were banned. As of today, newly formed political parties will become legal bodies upon presentation of founding registrations to the Ministry of Interior.

It is expected that the first application will be made by the Nationalist Democracy Party, whose founding preparations were conducted by Turgut Sunalp. After submitting the founding registration to the Ministry of Interior at 1000 hours, Sunalp and the other founders will visit the tomb of Ataturk.

The Populist Party, which reports that founding preparations are in the final stage, is expected to make application on 18 May. This party, which was formed by Necdet Calp, sets 19 May as its target date for its establishment.

It is reported that preparation has begun on a single text combining the programs and draft bylaws that were written separately previously for the Grand Turkey Party, which, it is announced, will be established jointly by Ali Fethi Esener, Husameddin Gindoruk, and Mehmet Golhan. It is said that this party will also present its application for founding this week.

The Social Democrat Force, which is working on preparations to form a party within the social democrat wing, is in the process of determining the names of founders and creating a harmonious committee supplemental to the establishment of a party. It is reported that the work of the Social Democrat Force will, at a later stage, be able to be completed, but that application for founding will not be possible this week.

It is thought that the preparations of Aydin Yalcin and Turgut Ozal, who have announced publicly that they would form a party and later said, "We will make a statement after other parties become certain," are not progressing much and that these persons and their colleagues may unite with parties that are established.

The Ministry of Interior will send within 3 days of receipt a set of papers that includes an approved copy of the founding application and document that was submitted as well as appendixes to the application to both the attorney general and the Constitutional Court.

In accordance with Article 4 of the temporary law, the Ministry of Interior will, within 24 hours, forward to the National Security Council a copy of the founding registration and its appendixes (excluding the party program and bylaws). The National Security Council will, within 20 days, give the results of its investigation to both the attorney general and to the Ministry of Interior, which, in turn, will relay them to the political party.

The council, after completing its investigation, will make a decision regarding those persons it deems unsuitable for these duties and regarding the total number of founding members. New founders may be proposed by approved founders to replace those the council decides are inappropriate.

The Nationalist Democracy Party of retired general Sunalp will apply to the Ministry of Interior today. The party program and bylaws were distributed to founding members yesterday. Sunalp will hold a press conference at noon today.

The founding members of the Nationalist Democracy Party will meet at party headquarters today and go together to the Ministry of Interior. At 0900 hours, they will submit the party founding application and documents.

Upon his arrival at party headquarters yesterday morning, Sunalp told reporters that it would be objectionable to announce the names of the founders prior to informing the Ministry of Interior. Sunalp said, "You have some names. What else do you want? It is obvious who the founders are. All are well-known persons."

At 0930 hours, the group will go to the tomb of Ataturk and pay its respects in the spiritual presence of Ataturk. At 1000 hours, a ceremony will be held at party headquarters. A founders' meeting is scheduled for 1100 hours, and at noon, Sunalp and the founders will hold a press conference. At 1300 hours, there will be a picnic buffet, and in the evening, at 1930 hours, there will be a cocktail party at which the founders and newsmen will get acquainted.

At 1030 hours yesterday morning, former member of parliament Ahmet Zeydan talked with Sunalp. Prior to the discussion, Zeydan told reporters, "I have close friends here. If Sunalp wants me to support him from Hakkari, I will."

Populist Party

The 29 known founders of the Populist Party rested at their homes on Sunday.

Thirty copies were made of the party program draft that was prepared by the Populist Party program committee, and these were distributed to the 29 known members. While the founders were home yesterday morning resting, they also examined the program draft.

The founders will meet today at the chairman general's office on Cinnah Avenue to discuss the program draft they have studied.

It is expected that the Populist Party will make application to form the party at the Ministry of Interior on Wednesday, 18 May 1983.

Grand Turkey Party

The Esener, Cindoruk, and Golhan groups, which are continuing preparations to form a party on the right, made intensive contacts yesterday. Work was carried out to combine the programs and draft bylaws that were drawn up by each of the three groups separately into a single text. It was reported that the party's official application to become a legal body will be made soon after Monday, 16 May.

It is asserted that the party's name, Grand Turkey Party, and its symbol, the bee, are definite. It is being said that the official application to attain legal status will be made tomorrow or Wednesday, at the latest.

Anticipated Founders

It is expected that the Grand Turkey Party's founding committee will consist of about 50 members. Persons expected to take a place on the founding committee are:

Esener, Cindoruk, Golhan, Resat Akkaya, Ramazan Tekeli, Mukadder Sezgin, Nadir Yuzbasioglu, Emin Bilgic, Orhan Mentese, Melih Esenbel, Hasan Saglam, Ibrahim Goktepe, Ihsan Goksel, Vehbi Parlar, Hilmi Firat, Emin Alpkaya, Orhan Keceli, Vecihi Akin, Ali Dogan Unlu, Aziz Gumus, Alaaddin Aksoy, Tevfik Fikret Alpaslan, Nurettin Ayanoglu, M. Nedim Bilgic, Bekir Sami Dace, Ahmet Sanver Dogu, Dogan Gurbuz, Halil Erdogan Gurel, Turan Guven, Selcuk Kantarcioglu, Adil Onmus, Fahri Ozturk, Mehmet Pamak, Talat Saracoglu, Avni Sahin, Prof Nezihi Sonmez, Osman Yavuz, Oguz Gokmen, Atalay Pekoz, and Hilmi Sabuncu.

Cindoruk and Golhan met together for a period of time yesterday morning.

A meeting with the owner of a three-story building located on the corner of Akay and Kucukesat Streets was held yesterday to discuss rental of the building for party headquarters.

The home on Bascavus Street at which Esener carries out his work was the scene of dense traffic. Consultative Assembly member Kantarcioglu, who arrived at the house early in the morning, left at about 0930 hours and returned at 1000 hours carrying several dossiers. At 1100 hours, Necip Gungor Kisaparmak and two colleagues came out of the house in order to make various contacts. In response to a question about the program and draft bylaws, Kisaparmak said, "The drafts have been completed as proposals, but they are not definitive."

When one of Esener's close working associates emerged from the house, members of the press asked, "Will there be agreement among the drafts?" The reply was, "Of course, there will. Is there another course?"

Social Democrat Force

At an expanded meeting to be held today, the Social Democrat Force will decide upon the party founders and make initial decisions.

The Social Democrat Force group is providing information to provincial representatives who have arrived during the past few days. This information includes the context of talks held between the committee and founders and details about organizational work. At the expanded Social Democrat Force meeting scheduled for today, the results of these contacts will be discussed and the first definite decisions will be made.

In the meantime, the Social Democrat Force met with several academicians yesterday morning and began preparations on the party program and bylaws. In addition to having just begun work on the program and bylaws, it was learned that the list of high-ranking founders will not remain intact, in the manner determined previously, until 19 May. There is a great possibility that the list will be given to the Ministry of Interior towards the end of the month.

It is asserted that contacts by the group with several Social Democrat unionists are being made, but that the unionists are still unable to reach a final decision.

Meanwhile, Ferda Guley, who reported that work is underway to form the Turkish Social Democrat Party, gave a statement in behalf of the group to ZDF, Germany's radio and television office, and said, in summary:

"There is agreement today in Turkey among the people. There was agreement that the 12 September takeover resulted from the anarchy and terrorism, the lack of security for lives and property that existed prior to 12 September. The people reaffirmed this agreement at a very high level with the constitution referendum. The political parties that will be formed will take part in the 6 November general elections consciously aware of this agreement."

11673
CSO: 3554/295

TURKEY

MUMCU ON NEED FOR POLITICOS' DECLARATION OF NET WEALTH

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 May 83 pp 1, 11

[Article by Ugur Mumcu: "Disclosure of Worth"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] We fully support the proposal made by HURRIYET that "party leaders and founders should declare their net worth."

We are entering a new era. It is necessary to draw up the rules for this new era from the very outset. This is why we welcome the idea of net worth disclosure as a useful proposal.

Article 71 of the Constitution endorses /net worth disclosure/ by those in public service /as an imperative/ and says that "those who serve in the legislative and executive branches also" /have the same obligation/. Let us expand this proposal with another: Newspapers, magazines and the administrators of unions, associations and foundations--political bedfellows all--ought to make these declarations also.

And that is not all: The parties ought to publish in the newspapers every year their sources of income and their expenditures. We know from past examples. Parties accuse one another of "taking assistance from shadowy sources." The only way to prevent this is to keep accounts of party donations and publish them. Then the citizen has a chance to compare the parties' income and outlay. Rumors and accusations, whether justified or not, would thus be prevented to an extent.

Let us make the proposals more concrete:

Would it not be beneficial to have party leaders and founders publish a "white paper" individually, listing the assets they have acquired, the commercial firms with which they have been affiliated and real property they have acquired through inheritance over the past 20 years? There is, of course, also a question of including in this disclosure real and movable properties settled on their parents, wives and children.

It would undoubtedly be beneficial to have each party publish such a "white paper." This would make it easier to see for whom the parties serve as spokesmen. Was it not found that certain public officers connected with shady dealings in the files of the High Court had greater wealth than their salaries would indicate?

Now, would these suspicions and rumors not be prevented if a ministry undersecretary or a general director who is a party founder declared the wealth he possesses? From this standpoint, this proposal is to the benefit of party founders and parties alike. It is for just this reason that declarations of worth ought to be published within the next 2 weeks or so. It would not even be necessary, perhaps, to publish a book in the initial stage. The newspapers would gladly publish these disclosures of worth. The first time is free.

I wonder, too, if newspaper owners, administrators and writers have ever considered issuing declarations of worth?

Perhaps you have forgotten; let me remind you. The general manager of a right-wing newspaper once left the newspaper and joined the founders of another newspaper. All this time, the right-wing paper plastered its front page with serious accusations against its former administrator. The newspaper's former manager, according to the articles, had been paid "a 33-million-lira certificate of deposit" and this money had been converted into a dollar account at the Central Bank in Zurich. The awesome accusations did not stop there. The writer went on to ask publicly about the former general manager:

--"Is this not the person who lent his pen to a certain businessman in return for percentages of his receipts on the sale of trucks and steel? Indeed it is! The longer you live, the more you see..."

In fact, the longer you live, the more you learn. Which is to say that certain newspapermen, certain newspaper administrators make money by taking "percentages on the sale of trucks and steel." Okay, had that reporter just learned of the former manager's perspicacity? Did no one at the newspaper know about these revolving doors, had no one seen or suspected that the manager was on the take? Did someone just happen to remember these pay-offs when the general manager left the right-wing newspaper? Or did he make a confession when he left saying, "I took these pay-offs"? On what date, and how, did the newspaper learn of these matters reverberating in the columns of the newspaper?

There is no way for us to know all this, of course, but it does show that certain newspaper administrators and writers have enjoyed a life-style far beyond their income. Was this standard of living made possible by the "percentages received on the sale of steel and trucks" or by "hidden assets" acquired from "whistle-blowers" on certain conglomerates and businessmen? We do not know.

They are the ones who ought to know. After all, the accused and the accuser were both on the inside.

Openness is good; newspaper administrators, writers, correspondents and union, association and foundation administrators ought to publish declarations of worth right along with party founders. Only in this way will it be known on whose behalf the press, journalists and newspaper editors speak or whose interests they look out for. Is there any other way?

HURRIYET, our highest-circulation newspaper, has made this just and appropriate proposal. We add to this proposal one of our own and support it with all our might.

We call on other newspapers to support these two proposals. We urge you to try it and see.

EREL ON CALP'S VIEW OF DIRECTED PARTY FORMATION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 16 May 83 p 6

[Article by Teoman Erel]

[Text] The proposal of Necdet Calp, which caused a reaction, even created a stir in some mentalities for the first time in 38 years.

In a statement made a day before President Kenan Evren's Kirkclareli speech, Calp said that another party on the left other than his own should not be formed. He stated:

"We request that the view that reigns in the administration for a single party on the left and a single party on the right be reflected in laws that are passed.

"In other words, let there be a return to a permit system when forming parties. Let the administration indicate which endeavor it likes on the left and on the right and refuse permission to the remainder to form parties."

Such a request, coming in the middle of May 1983, was not liked, not even by Carp's close friends. Some people we know who are working to establish the Populist Party said:

"If only he had not said that. But he has."

Those who think in this manner should not be too upset. Had Calp said the same thing 38 years ago, it would have become the ultimate democrat and pluralist issue.

In a series by Ilber Ortayli published in our newspaper, an interesting discussion dating back to June 1945 was mentioned:

"It was just about then that editor Ziyad Ebuzziya wrote in TASVIR about the need to form a second party. The next day Ekrem Usakligil replied in the SON POSTA, claiming that two parties were not possible."

In those days, while these debates were going on among the public and within the Republican People's Party group, Cankaya made the choice of democracy. A heavier weight was placed on the democracy scale, and, in 1950, the Democrat Party, with

its election victory, overthrew the 27-year-old Republican People's Party by democratic means.

One wonders what wind is blowing in Cankaya today.

Will there be a direct return to the "permit system for establishing a party," which is deemed anachronistic even in the Consultative Assembly? If not, will a party that provides a petition and that carries out formulated principles be considered to have been established legally?

The president's Kirklareli speech clarifies this subject, which is of great interest:

"Political parties will be formed without obtaining prior permission. We included this article for the following reason. A party that comes to power could create difficulties for the formation of new parties."

The president, in his Tekirdag speech, denied reports -- and expectations -- that the council would be personally able to close down parties it does not like and that laws would be designed to do so. He insisted upon this and stated twice:

"The closure of parties will be carried out by the Constitutional Court -- not by any individual or office."

As 16 May approached, no serious sign was seen that confirmed rumors that the council would not give permission to form parties it did not want. Those who consider themselves close to the council -- or who find it suitable to appear to be so -- intensified this gossip.

Rumors and reports that former provincial chairmen would be included in the political ban probably stemmed from the same sources. Yet, legal standards on this issue were set, and the list of those banned was made public in the RESMI GAZETE. In the Cankiri speech, the possibility of extending the list was mentioned, not as a decision, but as a "warning," as a supplementary measure that could be applied if individuals did not act carefully in the future.

In accordance with laws that have been passed up until now, the study to be made by the council will be conducted on the lists of party founders. However, new founders will be able to be announced to replace those who are not deemed appropriate. These investigations will not be able to abolish the legal character of a party that has been established.

The elimination of legal character will only be possible through a Constitutional Court decision.

After today, it will become clear how official announcements that are made will be reflected in practice. It is understood that the first applications will be presented by the Sunalp group and, following that, by the Esener-Cindoruk group. If the formation of these parties, which both aim for the support of a rightist base, is not prevented, it will appear that the administration will not misuse the rules

it itself set down, even if its leaning is toward "unification of specific political tendencies under the same roof."

In that case, if more than one party based on rightist support is formed, then more than one party hoping for leftist support will be possible.

This is probably Galp's concern as well. Nevertheless, the way to eliminate this problem is not by inviting the council to take sides and to intervene arbitrarily, but by making a serious effort to unite endeavors based on the same grass-roots' support. If unification cannot be achieved during formation of the parties, it is possible later. If differences continue to exist until the elections, the president could summon the voters as he did in Tekirdag and say:

"Identify those party founders whose only passion is to be leader. Cast your votes accordingly."

Let the important phase reached today during the period of transition to democracy be auspicious and fortunate. Let no person, office, or faction commit a "foul" during the democratic struggle that has been begun. Let the game be played properly and by objective rules.

11673
CSO: 3554/295

RIGHTIST CINDORUK INTERVIEWED ON PARTY EFFORTS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 May 83 pp 1,11

[Article by Julide Gulizar]

[Text] Ankara--For the past month, the mornings in the capital city have been extraordinarily beautiful. For the past month, activity has begun in the capital city as early in the morning as possible. This has been particularly true in some homes, in some hotels ever since work on establishing political parties intensified in Ankara. When you phone these homes, these hotels, you must wait at least 15 minutes to reach the specific person with whom you wish to talk.

Thus it was that I had the opportunity to speak with Husamettin Cindoruk, whose efforts to form a party on the right brought him to Ankara for talk upon talk with various groups and meeting upon meeting with various groups. When he "recalled our university friendship," the result of my incessant quest was more than I had hoped for:

"Let's get together at my hotel for breakfast."

We joined in and were out on the streets with those who begin life early in the morning in the capital for the sake of politics, for we and Cindoruk were at opposite ends of Ankara. And I was at the hotel at the breakfast hour. It took me 10 minutes to get word to Cindoruk that I was there, because of his phone conversations. And it took one trip up and down to get him downstairs because of his conversations. We were finally face to face. I said:

"Greetings, my friend, after many long years."

"Yes, hello again after many, many years."

"I find it not at all bad to meet at such a table when there is only a day left to form a party. How is today's schedule? It must certainly be full."

"Yes, nearly every minute is taken up. There are again several meetings."

"Today is the last day. Registration will probably take place tomorrow."

"Oh, no, we will not register tomorrow. First, we will make our announcement. After that, we will register."

"When I speak with anyone who is carrying out work to form a party on the right, they all say 'the purpose and the course of action is the same.' In that case, what will happen with so many groups? Shall we make a final evaluation of the right?"

"Why are there so many groups, really? Earlier, it became evident that there is no difference between our view and Esener's, and we joined together. We are progressing step-by-step and very carefully towards uniting. As is known, we joined with the Golhan group yesterday."

"Yes, and what about Prof Aydin Yalcin?"

"He is a noted, well-loved teacher. Why shouldn't we talk together?"

It is understood that Cindoruk will meet with Professor Yalcin either today or tomorrow. He is not speaking out, but it is clearly understood that this is a link in a chain. There is also the fact, as we learned, that Turgut Ozal will arrive in Ankara today. It was Ozal who came out very quickly in the beginning, but who later conducted his work extremely quietly and secretly. Cindoruk's reply was such that I could not refrain from asking, "Is there also the possibility of talking with Ozal?" "We talked at one time. We are friends. Of course, nothing can happen until we talk." Here, too, is another link.

"Has the list of founders been prepared? If not, are there persons still to be considered, with whom to hold talks? Who are they? Can you give some names, even if it is indirectly?"

"There are on our list very distinguished persons from various sectors of the community -- bureaucrats, academicians, retired military men, foreign affairs specialists, jurists..."

"I heard something along the lines that there was an agreement with two persons involved in foreign affairs."

"That is correct."

"What kind of evaluation can be made about the party you will establish?"

"We wish to form a party for the masses, to become a party that will foster a sound balance in the transition to democracy. It is not that we wish this, we are required to do this. We are in a position to engage in long-term thinking. It is for this reason that it is not possible to talk with, to reach agreement with, or to unite with groups that think in the short term or that give the impression that they are being established for short-term goals."

"Are the party's name and emblem definite?"

"The name is set. It is the Grand Turkey Party. We are thinking a little longer about the emblem."

"Shall we talk about the emblem that was attached to your party?"

"How is that?"

"You began to work very rapidly on your party. Work to unify was carried out with great intensity. This work reminded everyone of ants or bees. A reporter recently said, "If it were up to me, I would select the bee or the ant as an emblem."

We laughed. Cindoruk devotes his life to a cause as he did during his school years, and he does not betray secrets. I reminded him of that. Again he laughed. "Let me tell you a secret so as to contradict this," he said. "We reached an agreement with the deputy attorney general of the republic, Nadir Yuzbasioglu. He is on our list as a founder."

"Thank you. That was a nice secret to tell."

This time it was my turn to laugh. A thought came to mind that caused me to chuckle. When asked why I was laughing, I explained. We then laughed together. It had been during a discussion that Cindoruk spoke of a noted, learned thinker, "Huscin." He said, "Huscin," and stopped. At first, we were unable to figure out who Huscin was. We wore ourselves out trying to solve the puzzle. In the end, we solved it. It was a shortened form of the name, Husamettin Cindoruk. When we asked why he used this name, we received an interesting response, "If I said, 'I say this,' you would have asked, 'And who are you?' When I said, 'Huscin,' you did not think about me. It is really very simple."

"Huscin, the noted thinker," of 30 years ago is now the Husamettin Cindoruk who is conducting work to form a party on the right. He is the Cindoruk who now speaks in his own name and who causes others to listen to him.

11673
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DOGAN'S IMPRESSION OF CURRENTS ON RIGHT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 May 83 pp 1,11

[Article by Yalcin Dogan]

[Text] Ankara--There is a way of saying "good-bye" left over from the Ottoman days. When bidding farewell in the past, people used to say, "Devletle," to each other. It means, "Go with health, with joy." "Devletle" also had another meaning. This term also carried the meaning, "Let the state be one with you. Let the government be one with you."

This word, which is steeped in history, is now being used among the founding members of Turgut Sunalp's party. When saying "good-bye" to one another, they hug with both hands and both say, "Devletle."

"Devlet."

"Devletle, my friend."

Either call it an association of ideas or accept it as a symbol. If you wish, place it in quotes for a broader interpretation of a simple observation -- "Devletle."

When you look at the founding committee, you see that a "free market economy" lies in the hearts of most of the members as their economic philosophy. However, when things become difficult, you will also be able to detect that the representatives of those who act "together with the state" are collected in the Nationalist Democracy Party.

Is the Asilcelik Corporation in a difficult situation? How can it be saved? "Together with the state, my friend. Together with the state." Is the Guney Industries Corporation in trouble? How will it be saved? "Together with the state, my friend. Together with the state." Those who work in holding companies and banks with which Asilcelik and Guney Industries are affiliated, those who are advisers there, those who have taken on duties of members of the administrative councils now bid farewell to each other in the same manner:

"Devletle."

"With the state, my friend, devletle."

Several years ago, when the economic decisions of Turgut Ozal, who was very close to these circles, were being applied, there was a saying that infuriated these circles. When large firms such as Asilcelik and Guney Industries fell into difficult straits, when industry was confronted with serious problems, when the money shortage intensified the crises encountered by the firms, Ozal made this proposal:

"Let them sell their beach houses. Let them sell their villas."

It was probably then that the distinguished circles of Istanbul began to grow angry with Ozal and showed this everywhere. It even reached the point where, as a result of the anger, Ozal chose the course of "cooperating" with the Cindoruk-Golhan crew. Whereas the "distinguished circles" of Istanbul felt themselves to be closer to Turgut Sunalp, the small tradesmen of Anatolia and the middle-sized merchant and industrialist began to feel themselves closer to Cindoruk and Golhan. There may not be much difference between Ozal and the Cindoruk team as far as an economic base is concerned. There is, however, a "technical problem" that requires a solution. In all his announcements to date, Ozal has said, "I will form my party, and I will become the party's chairman general." Now during efforts to unite the right at the grass-roots' level, what is wanted is to forget these words of Ozal. The number of persons who say, "Ozal spoke prematurely and entrapped himself. Now this formula is being considered," increases with every passing day. Had the aforementioned "technical problem" been solved, perhaps the Anatolian merchant and craftsman would also see more clearly how close he can feel towards Ozal.

There are both differences and similarities between the situation of Union of Chambers Chairman Mehmet Yazar, whose name was mentioned frequently at one time, and that of Ozal. Yazar's heart lies with Sunalp. He wants to engage in politics there. However, the stock exchanges, the associations, and the chambers that elected him do not think as Yazar does at all. For this reason, if Yazar takes a place in Sunalp's party as Union of Chambers chairman, he fears he will have no "support." Therefore, he worries about diminishing the contribution he will be able to give Sunalp.

Agreement at the economic level is the most obvious factor that would facilitate cooperation between the Cindoruk-Golhan team and Ozal. If Aydin Yalcin also joins in with this team in the days ahead, it will be necessary to interpret this as a normal development. In this way, unification of the right will have been ensured.

The name of the new party that assures unity on the right is certain. It is the Grand Turkey Party. Its emblem is also known. It is the bee.

11673
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LOOPHOLE FOUND IN NEW LAW ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 May 83 p 80

/Article: "Lesser Evil--Conscientious Objectors Want To Shorten Civilian Service by Making Early Application, as Early as in Childhood"

/Text/ Though one among thousands, the application was unique. In early May, David Moritz Paul Hofferbert of Frankfurt requested the local alternate service office to certify him as a conscientious objector. The request was passed promptly to the examining board, and Hofferbert was immediately "asked to submit a document showing his origin for further processing."

There is no great hurry, however, since a decision concerning the request is not due until 1 May 2000. "Mr Hofferbert," as the office addressed him, is only 1 year old.

Chances are the baby is the youngest FRG citizen who would rather help the sick and take care of the old than do armed service. His father, lawyer Michael Hofferbert, as his legal representative, above all is out to show "by taking a demonstrative action" that there is a loophole in the controversial "New Conscientious Objectors Law": if one applies in time, even though certification is not made for some years, one need do only 16 months' civilian service--not 20 as required under the new law.

According to lawyer Hofferbert, the possibility for anyone, regardless of age, to avoid the longer civilian service is the result of a "legislative boner." Says Hofferbert, who pointed out "quite a number of "formal weaknesses" during the public Bundestag hearings: "One can in fact let the new law completely run its course."

It is very simple as long as application is made by 30 June of this year, for a transitional regulation states that persons subject to civilian service "who have been certified as conscientious objectors after this law goes into effect on the basis of a request made before 1 July 1983" will continue to "do 16 months' civilian service."

True, the amended law states that application can be made "no earlier than 6 months before completion of one's 18th year," but this age limit does not apply until the law goes into effect on 1 January 1984. The transitional regulations do not contain this provision.

The Defense Ministry in Bonn is aware of this subterfuge, but its officials hope that the time until the end of June will pass unnoticed--is probably in vain. The Greens in Hesse have already called on "all young people who are considering refusing military service to submit their applications without any delay." In a "guideline concerning the new conscientious objectors law,"

ANTIMILITARISMUS INFORMATION states that it is of the "utmost urgency" that this step be taken. The only risk in citing the old law, it states, is a summons to demonstrate one's conscientious objections orally, and this is "the lesser evil" compared with the longer civilian service.

Like Hofferbert's baby, the 4-year-old twin sons of fellow lawyer Ulrich Koch have providently requested being certified as conscientious objectors. They always can beat a retreat; as lawyer Hofferbert has checked, they can "withdraw their applications at any time."

8790
CSO: 3620/353

MILITARY

PORUGAL

NATIONAL GUARD REORGANIZATION OBJECTIVES LISTED

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 5 May 83 p 4

/Text/ The media visited the Largo do Carmo (Lisbon) general headquarters of the National Republican Guard /GNR/ yesterday in the course of the commemoration of its anniversary. After the welcoming ceremony for the journalists, Gen Tome Pinto, the general commander of the military branch, explained the GNR's operations and missions. He underscored the shortage of human and material resources needed to carry out the mission it is charged with. Gen. Tome Pinto particularly stressed that while the European average is one traffic patrol for each 50 kilometers of road, in Portugal it is one for each 250 kilometers.

The GNR's general commander also pointed out the objectives being proposed for development in the short and medium term. These are: legal status of the personnel and overall reorganization (for which a GNR Personnel Statute and a corresponding General Service Regulation are being drawn up, as well as a study aimed at introducing changes to the basic law of this military branch); the creation of areas for enlarging and replacing present barracks (he announced that the traffic brigade should shortly be headquartered in Laranjeiro, on the Southern highway); resolve training problems of soldiers and officers; proceed with the admission of subalterns and create conditions to increment the recruitment of sergeants (which can begin in January 1984 if the GNR Statute is approved by October of this year); creation of a logistics doctrine and establishment of a valid and fruitful system to improve the troops' operational activities; review and develop social support (it was underscored that the only source of funds for the social facilities relies on withholdings from salaries and nothing is obtained from the state budget); gradually bring in data processing and, finally, develop moral values, the respect for tradition, and the pride of the members of this security force -- which Gen Tome Pinto considers the primary objective.

The GNR's general commander also stated that it is indispensable for the National Security Law to be approved and promulgated so as to clarify the objectives and responsibilities of the military forces.

9935

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

LACK OF ACCESS TO FISHING GROUNDS IDLES FLEET

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 11/12 May 83 p 3

[Article by Peter Sartorius, editorial staff: "German Deep Sea Fishing: A Fleet Put Out of Service, For Sale, Scrapped--The Expelled Hunters of the Seas--Even With the Few Remaining Ships There is no Profit to be Made, Since There are Hardly Any Places for Nets Left"]

[Text] The "Bomber" will no longer be making many trips. The little round man sits around in a bad mood in the mess of one of those floating fish factories whose keels were laid at a time when freedom of the seas still seemed to be almost unlimited and in the fishing port of Bremerhaven a proud phalanx of upright shipping companies attested to the power and glory of the FRG deep-sea fishing fleet. Mayor and treasurer Heinz Brandt, later after leaving the ship, says: "A long list of bodies," and with a sigh digs into the past looking for an answer to the question of what actually became of them, of Janssen and the North German Deep-Sea Fishing Co, of Friedrich Busse and Grundmann & Groeschle, of Ebeling and Co and the Nonprofit Deep-Sea Fishing Co. In part the names are still there on the facades which have been whitewashed in a bleached gray, but the nameplates of the companies have long since been removed and new ones put up, for example, the nameplate of a company that sells corrosion preventative or of a heating company. There has long since been no smell of fish around here and even less the smell of big money. There are no longer many German trawlers.

The Bomber spent half a life on such ships, and now for the most part he sits on land, on terra firma. At least those who know him say that this has thrown him off balance even if he does make an effort not to let it show. He keeps wearing the same frayed, faded sailor's sweater as he did in the golden time of the hunters when he was looking for quarry in the flour sack below Iceland or in the pits of Roest off the Norwegian coast or on Cape Walloe below Greenland. That was his world and it is done for. It is no wonder that he has fallen into a gloomy mood and broods over the trends of the times. From the very beginning it was somewhat strange that the FRG of all countries, more or less a landlocked country, built up a fleet after the war on a scale which in technical efficiency and quality was scarcely achieved by any other country involved in fishing. Not even by the British. And not at all by the Icelanders who peered through their binoculars, terrified, when the freezer ships with the black-red-gold flag appeared at their doorstep, giants of ships which scooped the fish by the gross out of the sea and processed it right on board into finished or at least semi-finished products.

The Revolt of the Icelanders

Things went along well for a while. But then the stock of fish in the traditional fishing grounds declined dramatically, and in an act of wild revolt, which at the time was covered by no international law, the Icelanders became the first to extend their sovereign boundaries far into the open sea. They shifted them in stages 200 nautical miles from the coast in order to block foreigners, all foreigners, from access to the treasure in the sea which had become precious. Naturally it would be unjust to make the Germans, and them alone, responsible for the fact that cod and pollack and even the Germans' favorite fish, the redfish, became increasingly scarce. All fishing nations plundered the seas, and between the rival British and Icelanders there were even regular battles at sea with cannon shots across the bow and ramming and cut lines. The emotions at the time were even more churned up than the sea, and they did not subside until the mid-1970s when it became clear that freedom of the sea was definitely a thing of the past, that the fishing grounds had to be divided up in grids, that there was absolutely no other way to proceed than to ration the catches, to regulate the catch. It would be too complicated once again to go into the whole dispute which set in when the countries, especially within the EC, began to dicker over the quotas because they were all trying to continue to keep their fishing industry alive. In any event, the result was that in Bremerhaven and even in Cuxhaven, the other German fishing center, shipping companies began to die. Germany, with its narrow strip of coastline, was the loser.

Thus, the Bomber will no longer make many trips. By the way, he gets his name from the heavy gourd-shaped iron balls which keep the fishing gear on the bottom, thus the Bomber. His last job was helmsman on the "Schuetting." When he hears the word "Schuetting" he wakes up from his melancholy. It would be possible to talk for hours about the ships, for example, about how it was when the nerves of cook's mate gave out. At that time the "Schuetting" was still named the "Vest Recklinghausen." Shortly after departure, while still in the mouth of the Weser, the cook's mate set the ship on fire because he wanted to return home. Eight crewmen burned to death in their cabins because the ship's wall first had to be cut open in order to be able to free the unfortunate men.

Fishing is full of such stories. But most of them take place in a distant past. "My God," says the Bomber, "those were the good old days when the captain beat the firemen to a pulp even before we left." All of that is gone. Even the "Schuetting" no longer exists. "May she rest in peace and the entire fleet with her," says the Bomber pathetically and falls back into silence. After being reconditioned, the "Schuetting" had become a real lead ship, one which brought home more fish from its trips than most others, which perhaps was also due to the fact that the captain was an especially sharp fellow, a man possessed, ruthless toward himself and the crew and equipped with a nose for fish which enabled him to find the quarry in places where even the competition did not suspect it to be. Naturally it is also said of this captain that he even found fish in places where the ship actually did not have any business being. But things like that are always said by everyone in the fishing business about almost everyone else. Fishermen always steam hard on the border of legality, and in the period of growing limitations and declining fish stocks, that is also practically the only possible course.

The wildest stories circulate. For example, the one about the Russian who according to all accounts fished far in excess of the quotas and in spite of that had only the allowed quantities in the fish hold when the control checks came. The story had it that in the middle of the night another Russian steamed up, a similar ship which even had the same name but much less fish on board. The first Russian then took off at full speed and left everything else to its double. And what about the Bailey Bank, a wretched fishing ground somewhere or other west of the Faeroe Islands, beyond all protective zones where hunting is permitted only on a limited basis? When the trip is over, it must be shown where all the fish were caught. If the entries for the catch are to be believed, then so much fish comes from the Bailey Bank that the fish must really be stacked up there and one would have to come with a dredge instead of a ship.

But we wanted to talk about the "Schuetting." Two years ago the captain's instinct told him that no good would come of the hunt. He left the ship and since then has been pulling shift duty with the Bremerhaven fire department as captain of the fireboat "Weser". But the Bomber continued to sail on the "Schuetting" until the ship was finally battered by an iceberg below Greenland. That was at the beginning of this year and presumably the Bomber was much too occupied at the time with the damaged ship to realize that not only had the ship suffered the deciding blow but also his professional career. Ship and helmsman were scrapped. Perhaps scrapped is not the right term as far as the Bomber is concerned. But it does fit the ship which was worn out in 20 years of fishing. Although the damage was rather slight, it was taken out of the fleet and sold off to a Greek. The shipping company had to keep the Bomber. A veteran helmsman cannot be gotten rid of as easily as a ship. Only the Bomber has no longer had any ship since then. Somehow or other he has been stranded in Bremerhaven and mourns for his ship which now lies on the bottom of the sea at the mouth of the English Channel. The ship had just been brought out of the harbor by the Greek when it went down under extremely dubious circumstances. The Bomber says: "Now, really, we could have managed that, but perhaps a bit more elegantly."

In the Mess of the Freezer Ship

Naturally that is pure sarcasm. But what else is there for a man who feels the gradual decay of the fleet so strongly in his own purse? On land the Bomber draws only anchorage wages, and they are only a portion of sea wages. And beyond that fishermen say: "The wages are for steering." The money that counts in fishing come from the profits of the catch in which the crew participates. Anyone without a ship cannot catch any money either. As far as the Bomber is concerned, he no longer gets more than a few odd trips on different vessels, and even then he must have good luck because there are far too many unemployed helmsmen in Bremerhaven, and even many a captain is glad today if he may be on the bridge at least as third mate.

At the moment the Bomber is serving on the "Karlsburg," and at first glance everything seems to be fine. He shoots the breeze with the second helmsman and the chief, the master machinist, in the oilcloth congeniality of the mess,

which is really his home. His hands encircle a china mug of coffee. On a fishing trawler it is always a good idea to hold cups firmly, otherwise it can happen that the whole thing sloshes into your face. The ship is located at 55°33' N and 8°35' E. They talk. About home. About family. And about what they will do on vacation.

That is all rather uninteresting. Instead, let us turn to the ship. The "Karlsburg" is one of these freezer ships which--unlike the fresh fish ships with 3-week voyages--remain out for months at a time, fillet the catch and then can it or keep it frozen. At the end of the 1960s the Germans had gone into the freezing business in a big way, which was very understandable to the extent that they practically had to cover the greatest distances to the fishing grounds. At the time the factory ships were put in the water, who was in a position to suspect that such a fleet policy would steer them directly toward their own decline?

Decline? for heaven's sake, no, the shipowners keep on saying, even today; there will always be a German fleet nucleus, in spite of all the restrictions. Decline? We hope not, is what they say much more cautiously at city hall in Bremerhaven and think with concern about the rate of unemployment in the port city which is distressingly high anyway, at 15 percent, and about the fact that the fishing industry provides every fourth industrial job in

Bremerhaven. Decline? Definitely, inevitably, says local Bundestag member Horst Grunenberg, a Social Democrat, and he brings down the wrath of the entire industry on himself when he states in the party's press service: "The nation's frozen-fish fleet, which was designed because it was believed that Norway would join the EC, because no one believed that Iceland would establish a 200-nautical-mile fishing zone, because no one suspected that Greenland would leave the EC,...has lost its foundation." And naturally it was also not possible to foresee that the Canadian seal slaughter would become a German campaign issue, and as a result of that Canada, too, would block German ships from access to its fishing grounds.

Actually, not many fishing areas are left, large catches are history and quite logically the FRG's fleet has been drastically reduced. While 1 and 1/2 decades ago there were 100 fresh-fish ships and 50 freezer ships under steam, today there are just 11 fresh-fish ships and 15 freezer ships. All the others are idled, sold, scrapped. For a long time the fishing port of Bremerhaven has been used for other industrial purposes, and not only have most shipping companies died. The whole atmosphere is gone. In the auction halls, where previously redfish, cod and pollack came under the hammer every day, soccer games could be played today without bothering the operation. Increasingly less often, ships bring their cargo there, and almost never German ships. And the fishermen's dives? The "Weserklause" and the "Mausefalle" were famous starting places. Today they are called the "Adana" and "Istanbul", and if one opens the door, presumably one is hit by the smell of garlic and no longer by the smell of fish. But no fisherman opens the door anyway. Turkish guest workers have the place to themselves.

In a very measured manner, Mayor Brandt says that it is "a difficult situation," by which he means that his city is still a fishing center only on a limited scale. To be sure, when viewed overall, fish consumption in the FRG has not changed very much in the past few years. But because of the decline of German deep-sea fishing, the import routes have changed. It used to be that all fish came across the sea, across the blue border, to Bremerhaven or Cuxhaven. Today it no longer arrives only by ships but also by trucks across the green border, from the neighboring countries, to distribution centers which no longer are exclusively located in the port cities. Heinz Brandt repeats his statement of "a difficult situation" and this time he means the situation in which deep-sea fishing finds itself. The fleet must not be decreased in size any further, otherwise the entire infrastructure will collapse: "Then there will be the big explosion, then we will have the sudden end."

There really would have to be more unloading and dismantling. Because it is true that even that which the four remaining shipping companies call their fleet nucleus is still much too large for the little bit of fish which the Germans are permitted to hunt. Even the shipowners and the Association of German Deep-sea Fishing Companies candidly admit that it is one-third too large. Thus, only subsidies from Bonn can keep the fleet above water. But, on the other hand, might there not be reason for a bit of courage again? Is it not a good sign that, for the first time, the EC agreed this spring on a quota system and with it the haggling has ceased? Would it not perhaps be possible for the EC as a united political power to exert more pressure in the future on the coastal countries which do not belong to the EC and obtain larger catch quotas for their member countries? And is it also not true that the stocks of fish have gradually been recovering since the strict limitation? Horst Grunenberg does not have such hopes for the future. If a miracle does not take place, so he surmises, "soon half the freezer ships" will be "at the dock with no prospect for possible use." At the same time Grunenberg provides a scenario as to how it might be possible to utilize the fleet in a somewhat useful way. He suggests that the ships ought to be used as surveillance ships to control pollution in the waters of the North Sea.

An Oppressive Feeling

A sad future for the hunters. On board the "Karlsburg" Grunenberg's recommendations go from hand to hand. In the mess an embarrassing silence prevails. No, the situation is not such that the report would have especially shocked the Bomber, his fellow helmsman and the chief. For a rather long time now all three of them no longer have harbored any illusions. Just like the Bomber, the other two have likewise been put on land by the shipping company. The oppressive feeling which has been spreading comes from elsewhere: Where is the throaty clangor of the ship's bell which hurries the crew on deck to heave in and play out lines? Where is the muffled trampling of feet in hip-high rubber boots, where is the screech of the diesels which normally comes roaring over the men in the mess as soon as the iron door to the engine room swings open, where is the tortured groaning of the winch when the fishing gear is hauled on board? The three men on the "Karlsburg" sit around in absolute silence in the mess, and the Bomber could easily remove his hands from the coffee cup. The ship will not be rocked by the sea and thrown off balance for as long as he is on board.

The coordinates $55^{\circ}33'N$ and $8^{\circ}35'E$ mark the geographic location of Bremerhaven. The ship is in the shipyard for overhaul. The Bomber and the others have been put on board this ship by their shipping company in order to serve as night watchmen.

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NETHERLANDS

LOS TREATY SEEN OPENING OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDUSTRY

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[Article by goe: "The Netherlands and the Wealth of the Sea--Experts' Recommendation to Dutch Industry; Concentrate Research and Focus Supply and Services"]

[Text] It was not a simple decision for the Netherlands to sign the new LOS [Law of the Sea] treaty late last year. A total of 117 countries signed this treaty. Approximately 24 countries did not sign it, including the United States, the FRG and Great Britain. Many nations had difficulty with the fact that the treaty covers a large diversity of interests, including navigation, fishing, oil and gas drilling, deep-sea mining and environmental issues. Minister of Economics Gijs van Aardenne recently stated that the most controversial issue for the Netherlands involved the regulations on deep-sea mining, which impose all too many restrictions on private industry in the commercial exploitation of deep-sea resources, including regulations governing the compulsory transfer of technology and a large financial burden.

The Dutch minister, however, still finds this treaty positive, because for the first time it has established worldwide regulations which, in principle, promote investment in deep-sea exploitation and drilling activities. He is convinced that Dutch industry could benefit from this also. The minister added that the Netherlands should not simply rely on the expectation that due to its grand maritime tradition, it will be the one nation among all other nations to acquire a major share in the exploitation and production of the deep-sea resources offered by the sea in the area of food supply, energy and mining.

Dutch industry, he stated, has to adjust to suitable opportunities in time, although the present economic situation does not permit a generous effort. Van Aardenne is of the opinion that the Dutch offshore industry must focus its potential, especially with regard to technology. For this purpose, several programs and organizations are open to the industry, e.g., the Maritime Technological Research Program of the Industrial Council for Oceanology (Industriële Raad voor Oceanologie, IRO), of which most of the offshore companies are members, or the Foundation for the Coordination of Maritime Research (Stichting Coördinatie Maritiem Onderzoek, CMO), under which industry and research institutes cooperate and which coordinates individual research projects.

A report on the prospects offered by the exploitation and drilling of the sea by Dutch industry in view of the new LOS treaty also recommends a concentration of efforts. The report entitled "The Netherlands and the Wealth of the Sea" was authored by some 40 experts from industry, government and research under the auspices of the Future of Technology Foundation (Stichting Toekomstbeeld der Techniek). Five maritime areas were studied: food production from the sea, deep-sea oil and gas drilling, sea mining, permanent energy sources in the sea, and environmental control of the sea. The report gives the exploitation and the production of the wealth of the sea by Dutch industry good potential in the long run. The market potential in the areas of food supply and mining as well as energy is good to very good. According to the report, Dutch companies generally have difficulty gaining access to the extensive world markets; therefore they have to consolidate their strength. Furthermore, the technological gap to be bridged is still very wide in many of the marine sectors, while the know-how and experience which exists in the Netherlands is rather scattered. According to the report, the most promising aspect is a joint, coordinated policy by industry, government, research and education.

In detail, the potential of the food supply from the sea and of fishing, in particular, for the Dutch marine industry is very good. The markets for fish hatching, trade and processing are large markets. The technological gaps are small, and Dutch industry can easily acquire the required technology. However, the stipulations contained in the new LOS treaty regarding fishing in particular have a negative effect on the Netherlands (coastal nations can impose terms and conditions on foreign fishing boats, e.g., duties for fishing within a 200-sea-mile zone, or the obligation to land the catch on their shores). The report therefore contains the recommendation to cooperate with other coastal states.

In its study of sea oil and gas drilling, the report restricts itself to depths from 200 to 300 meters up. The potential for the Dutch offshore oil and gas drilling industry at these depths is not seen as favorable. The technological gap is too wide--the Netherlands lacks sufficient know-how and too little capacity exists for this type of new activity. While in the seventies, offshore oil and gas drilling was initially restricted to coastal waters and water depths of up to 300 meters, the interest in oil and gas in deeper waters increased during the second half of the seventies, according to the report. Yet the results of exploitation have been meager so far, and in view of the experience gained thus far, the potential for oil and gas production in deeper waters is not very good. Costs are also very high.

In the long run, oil and gas reserves in deeper waters could very well play an important role if the production from "cheaper" fields decreases and technological developments permit a less costly production. For various reasons, the Dutch offshore industry cannot exploit this potential easily. The report mentions the relatively small domestic market, the high initial costs, the lack of access to the international market due to protectionism, the small contribution to certain technologies and the lack of evaluation of international developments and of the oil companies' requirements. In this respect the report again recommends cooperation of government and industry, as in the case of aircraft industry.

In the area of permanent energy sources, Dutch industry has somewhat more favorable opportunities. The world market for sea wind, wave and thermal energy is very large. The technology offered by Dutch companies in these fields is good, and there is capital available for new activities. However, the technological gap in some sectors is still wide, and gaining access to the various markets is difficult. Of the four energy sources listed by the report--wind energy, tide power plants, wave energy and OTEC (Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion, during which energy is extracted with the aid of temperature differences between the sea water on the surface and the sea bed)--only the OTEC system offers good potential for Dutch industry, in addition to the small energy supply systems not listed. This market, which Hollandse Beton Groep is especially active in, is estimated to be an approximately 100-billion guilder market in the 1990s and 2000s. Dutch companies can build concrete designs, thermal exchangers and salt-water pumps. Participation in international development programs and a pilot project can enhance opportunities in the future.

With regard to wind energy, the report points to the fact that marine developments always follow developments on the ground. The first sea-wind park is not expected until later this century. Then Dutch industry will have a good starting position. The Dutch companies have too little technological know-how with regard to wave energy. However, in the future the Netherlands can very well profit from its experience in the area of waterworks construction. The market for tie-power centers is rather small and difficult to gain access to. The Netherlands' share in this market toward the end of this century is estimated at 3 to 5 billion guilders; here also the best prospects lie in the area of waterworks construction engineering.

Finally, as far as mining is concerned, the best prospects for Dutch industry are in ore production on the mainland. In the years to come, the production of tin, gold and black sands, e.g., titanium and chromium oxides, will be primary concerns. In view of the bad metal markets and economic prospects, however, the outlook regarding promotion of new projects is not bright. In principle, the Netherlands does have good opportunities, due to its experience in the area of reclaiming, design and construction of reclaimers and the presence of the Billiton group, which is active worldwide in the metal business.

In the area of deep-sea mining, the Netherlands should attempt, so the report states, to catch on to international developments, even if large investments are required and risks are high. The report recommends cooperation with other countries in oceanic research. The industry must particularly deal with improvements in production techniques, the supply of services to developing areas in the field of oceanographic measuring techniques and the development of new techniques for the production of ore in rougher and deeper waters.

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